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THE SUPREME COURT’S CHIEF JUSTICE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
Robert W. Gomulkiewicz*
Justice Clarence Thomas is one of the most recognizable members of the
United States Supreme Court. Many people recall his stormy Senate confirmation
hearing and notice his fiery dissenting opinions that call on the Court to reflect
the original public meaning of the Constitution. Yet observers have missed one of
Justice Thomas’s most significant contributions to the Court—his intellectual
property law jurisprudence. Justice Thomas has authored more majority opinions in intellectual property cases than any other Justice in the Roberts Court era
and now ranks as the most prolific author of patent law opinions in the history of
the Supreme Court. Thus, at a time when intellectual property has become one of
America’s most important assets, Justice Thomas has played an important role in
the evolution of America’s innovation law and policy.
This Article is the first to highlight the significance of Justice Thomas’s intellectual property jurisprudence. It considers how Justice Thomas emerged as
the Roberts Court’s “chief justice” of intellectual property law, authoring more
majority opinions than even colleagues known for their intellectual property law
prowess. The Article analyzes Justice Thomas’s key intellectual property opinions to understand their importance. It also highlights the distinguishing features
of these opinions, including their faithful adherence to textualism, appreciation
for the role of remedies, attention to technological and business context, awareness of the impact on intellectual property practitioners, and surprising unanimity. The Article concludes that Justice Thomas’s deep respect for the constitutional
separation of powers is at the heart of his intellectual property jurisprudence, as
his opinions invite and sometimes nudge Congress to play its leading role in
crafting intellectual property law.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the recent passing of the “notorious” Ruth Bader Ginsburg,1 Clarence Thomas may be the most famous Justice on the United States Supreme
Court. We remember his stormy Senate confirmation hearing. His fiery dissenting opinions often call for the Court to overrule important and longstanding
constitutional law precedents so that the law can reflect the original public
meaning of the Constitution. For most of the Roberts Court era, he has been the
* Judson Falknor Professor of Law and Director, Intellectual Property Law & Policy Graduate Program, University of Washington School of Law. For useful discussions and comments on drafts of this article, I thank Evan Hejmanowski, Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Kathryn
Watts, Zahr Said, Abigail Gomulkiewicz, Andrea Lairson, Bill Covington, and Jonas Anderson. For outstanding research assistance, I thank Robin Lustig, Mary Whisner, and especially Maya Swanes for her work on the core caselaw research for this Article. © 2020 Robert
W. Gomulkiewicz.
1 See generally IRIN CARMON & SHANA KNIZHNIK, NOTORIOUS RBG: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF
RUTH BADER GINSBURG (2015). In this context, of course, “notorious” is being used ironically as a term of endearment and respect for the late Justice Ginsburg.
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only member of the Court born and raised in the South and the only Justice
who is Black.2 He even draws attention to himself when he remains silent—as
he has done during most oral arguments before the Court.3
Despite this notoriety, observers have missed one of Justice Thomas’s
most significant contributions on the Court—his intellectual property law jurisprudence. Justice Thomas has written more majority opinions in intellectual
property cases than any other Justice during the Roberts Court era and now
ranks as the most prolific author of patent law opinions in the history of the
Supreme Court. This Article is the first to highlight the significance of Justice
Thomas’s intellectual property jurisprudence.4
Justice Thomas has emerged as the Roberts Court’s “chief justice” of intellectual property law at a time when intellectual property has become one of
America’s most valuable assets in the world economy. As the Roberts Court
has focused on patent law, Justice Thomas’s opinions for the Court have contributed to reducing the incidence of junk patents and the power of predatory
Justice Amy Coney Barrett, who was born in Louisiana, joined the Supreme Court in October 2020. See About the Court: Current Members, SUP. CT. OF THE U.S., https://www.sup
remecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx [https://perma.cc/WMV8-GCNP]. Ketanji Brown
Jackson will join the Court in autumn 2022, becoming the second Justice who is Black on
the Roberts Court. See Mary Clare Jalonick & Mark Sherman, Jackson Confirmed as First
Black Female High Court Justice, AP NEWS, (Apr. 7, 2022), https://apnews.com/article/ket
anji-brown-jackson-supreme-court-confirmation-f39263cdbb0c59c8a20a48edf9b6786e
[https://perma.cc/5V5G-T5L2].
3 See generally RonNell Andersen Jones & Aaron L. Nielson, Clarence Thomas the Questioner, 111 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 197 (2017). See also Brent Kendall & Jess Bravin, Under
Coronavirus Court Procedures, Clarence Thomas Finds His Voice, WALL ST. J. (May 10,
2020, 12:33 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/justice-clarence-thomas-finds-his-voice11589036401 [https://perma.cc/4XK7-H5EX]; Editorial Board, Justice Thomas’s Question
Time, WALL ST. J., (May 4, 2020, 6:16 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/justice-thomassquestion-time-11588630584 [https://perma.cc/SAY2-GMA5] (“Justice Thomas’s habit is to
let his colleagues make the inquiries. He once went 10 years without posing a question at
oral argument. . . . But holding oral arguments by conference call [during the COVID-19
pandemic] has . . . [given] a great chance for the public to witness the thoughtful Justice
Thomas in action.”). When the Court returned to in-person oral arguments in autumn 2021,
Chief Justice Roberts instituted a new hybrid format that supplemented the familiar free-forall questioning with a round of one-at-a-time questioning. See Adam Tiptak, Supreme Court
Tries to Tame Unruly Oral Argument, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com
/2021/11/01/us/supreme-court-oral-arguments.html [https://perma.cc/NF8W-MGVE] (noting
why Justices Thomas and Sotomayor like this format).
4 Other commentators have discussed Justice Thomas’s jurisprudence in other areas of the
law. See, e.g., Marah Stith McLeod, A Humble Justice, 127 YALE L.J.F. 196 (2017) (criminal law); Joel K. Goldstein, Calling Them as He Sees Them: The Disappearance of Originalism in Justice Thomas’s Opinions on Race, 74 MD. L. REV. 79, 80–96 (2014) (constitutional
issues related to race); Christopher E. Smith, Rights Behind Bars: The Distinctive Viewpoint
of Justice Clarence Thomas, 88 DET. MERCY L. REV. 829, 830–37 (2011) (prisoner rights);
Scott D. Gerber, Justice for Clarence Thomas: An Intellectual History of Justice Thomas’s
Twenty Years on the Supreme Court, 88 DET. MERCY L. REV. 667 (2011); Steven B. Lichtman, Black Like Me: The Free Speech Jurisprudence of Clarence Thomas, 114 PENN. ST. L.
REV. 415 (2009); Online Symposium, Justice Thomas and the First Amendment, FIRST
AMENDMENT CENTER (2008).
2
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patent trolls. Yet even as the Supreme Court asserts itself in patent law, Justice
Thomas’s incremental approach to deciding intellectual property cases allows
the Court to move carefully in the face of the ever-evolving technology and
business models of the information economy. His textualist approach continually reminds and sometimes nudges Congress to take the lead in innovation
policy, showing a fundamental respect for constitutional separation of powers.
Indeed, despite his reputation as the Court’s conservative iconoclast, liberal and
conservative Justices have consistently joined Justice Thomas’s opinions in intellectual property law cases.
This Article will make two contributions, one to intellectual property law
scholarship and the other to the scholarship about Justice Thomas as a member
of the Supreme Court. First, the Article will build on the work of scholars who
have tracked the Supreme Court’s recent interest in intellectual property cases.
These scholars address the reasons for the Court’s interest in intellectual property law and the general nature of its opinions.5 Peter Lee, for example, has explained how the Court’s patent law jurisprudence reflects a project of eliminating patent exceptionalism and assimilating patent doctrine into general legal
principles.6 This Article will extend previous scholarship by exploring the particular fingerprint that Justice Thomas has placed on the Court’s intellectual
property cases, especially in patent law.
Second, the Article will contribute to the scholarship about Justice Thomas’s contribution to the Supreme Court. Many scholars have taken an interest in
Justice Thomas, including publication of several recent books about his jurisprudence.7 As already mentioned, many commentators have addressed issues
related to Justice Thomas’s nomination to the Supreme Court and confirmation
by the Senate. Other commentators have discussed Justice Thomas’s originalist
approach to constitutional interpretation,8 emphasizing his opinions related to
civil rights and often reflecting on the role that race plays in his decisions. Corey Robin’s recent book, for example, argues that Black nationalism lies at the
heart of Justice Thomas’s jurisprudence.9 This Article, by contrast, will explore
5

See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, What the Federal Circuit Can Learn from the Supreme Court–and Vice Versa, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 787, 792–93 (2010); Timothy R. Holbrook,
Explaining the Supreme Court’s Interest in Patent Law, 3 IP THEORY 62, 63–65 (2013).
6 See generally Peter Lee, The Supreme Assimilation of Patent Law, 114 MICH. L. REV.
1413, 1422 (2016).
7 See generally COREY ROBIN, THE ENIGMA OF CLARENCE THOMAS (2019); MYRON MAGNET,
CLARENCE THOMAS AND THE LOST CONSTITUTION (2019); RALPH A. ROSSUM,
UNDERSTANDING CLARENCE THOMAS: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF RESTORATION (2014); KEVIN
MERIDA & MICHAEL A. FLETCHER, SUPREME DISCOMFORT: THE DIVIDED SOUL OF CLARENCE
THOMAS (2007); ANDREW PEYTON THOMAS, CLARENCE THOMAS: A BIOGRAPHY (2001); JOHN
GREENYA, SILENT JUSTICE: THE CLARENCE THOMAS STORY (2001); SCOTT DOUGLAS GERBER,
FIRST PRINCIPLES: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF CLARENCE THOMAS (1999).
8 See, e.g., MAGNET, supra note 7; ROSSUM, supra note 7; GERBER, supra note 7.
9 ROBIN, supra note 7; see also Stephen F. Smith, Clarence X? The Black Nationalist Behind Justice Thomas’s Constitutionalism, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 583 (2009); Angela
Onwuachi-Willig, Using the Master’s “Tool” to Dismantle His House: Why Justice Clar-
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contributions by Justice Thomas outside of race and civil rights, in an area of
law that is also vitally important to our national welfare, albeit in a different
way than issues of social justice.
Following this Introduction, Part I will provide a brief biography of Justice
Thomas, which provides context for a discussion of his intellectual property
jurisprudence. Part II will explain that the Roberts Court has taken a special interest in intellectual property cases and that Justice Thomas has written the
most intellectual property law majority opinions during the Roberts Court era.
It will then address how Justice Thomas came to play a leading role in the
Court’s intellectual property law jurisprudence. Part III will discuss Justice
Thomas’s key intellectual property law cases and will analyze their significance. Building on Part III, Part IV will highlight the distinguishing features of
Justice Thomas’s opinions, including their faithful adherence to textualism, appreciation for the role of remedies, attention to technological and business context, awareness of the impact on intellectual property practitioners, and surprising unanimity. Part V will provide concluding observations about Justice
Thomas’s important role in the evolution of United States innovation law and
policy.
I.

A BRIEF BIOGRAPHY OF JUSTICE THOMAS

Clarence Thomas was born in 1948 in Pin Point, Georgia, a small, predominantly Black community near Savannah, Georgia.10 His ancestors were enslaved West Africans who lived in the barrier islands and low country of Georgia, South Carolina, and northern Florida.11 He was the second of three
children born to M.C. Thomas and Leola Williams.12 Williams moved with her
three children to Savannah just before Clarence entered the first grade.13 Their
accommodations were bleak, and as a single parent, Williams had difficulty
making ends meet, so she sent Clarence and his brother to live with their
grandparents across town.14 Clarence Thomas called his grandfather “Daddy”
and his grandmother “Aunt Tina.”15
Thomas’s grandparents believed in hard work and the value of a good education. Thomas attended Catholic primary and secondary schools, often as one
ence Thomas Makes the Case for Affirmative Action, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 113 (2005); Mark V.
Tushnet, Clarence Thomas’s Black Nationalism, 47 HOW. L.J. 323 (2004); Angela
Onwuachi-Willig, Just Another Brother on the SCT: What Justice Clarence Thomas Teaches
Us About the Influence of Racial Identity, 90 IOWA L. REV. 931 (2004); Justin Driver, Justice
Thomas and Bigger Thomas, in FATAL FICTIONS: CRIME AND INVESTIGATION IN LAW AND
LITERATURE (Alison LaCroix et al. eds., 2017).
10 Justice Thomas tells his story in CLARENCE THOMAS, MY GRANDFATHER’S SON: A
MEMOIR 1 (2007).
11 Id. at 2–3.
12 Id. at 1–3.
13 Id. at 6.
14 Id. at 8–9.
15 Id. at 2, 9.
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of the first Black students to attend the school in segregated Savannah.16
Thomas helped his grandfather with his fuel and ice delivery businesses and,
during summers, worked on his grandfather’s farm.17 A few months shy of his
sixteenth birthday, Thomas decided to prepare for the Catholic priesthood and
eventually went to seminary in Missouri.18
After becoming disenchanted with the Catholic Church’s official silence
on racial injustice and following the racist comments of some of his classmates,
he left the seminary.19 He enrolled at the College of the Holy Cross in Massachusetts, and following graduation, he attended Yale Law School, graduating in
1974.20 After finding it difficult to land a law firm job in Georgia, he accepted
John Danforth’s offer to join the Missouri state attorney general’s office.21 Later, Thomas moved to an in-house counsel position at Monsanto Corporation.22
But three years after John Danforth’s election to the U.S. Senate, Thomas
joined Danforth’s Senate staff.23
In 1981, President Reagan appointed Thomas as an assistant secretary for
civil rights in the Department of Education.24 Following that service, he became chair of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, where he
served two four-year terms.25 Following his time at EEOC, President George
H.W. Bush nominated Thomas to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, and he joined the court in 1990.26 When Justice Thurgood Marshall retired from the Supreme Court, President Bush nominated Thomas to replace Marshall.27 Following a stormy confirmation hearing,28 Thomas joined

16

Id. at 14.
Id. at 21–28.
18 Id. at 30–32.
19 Id. at 32–44.
20 Id. at 89.
21 Justice Thomas has described the decision to work for Danforth as a critical juncture in
his life. Clarence Thomas et al., The Second Annual William French Smith Memorial Lecture: A Conversation with Justice Clarence Thomas, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 7, 27–28 (2009). According to Thomas, “I had tried in vain, during my third year at Yale Law School, to get a
job in my home state of Georgia at one of the big law firms. . . . So I was basically unemployed and married with a little kid, and student loans. That’s not a good position to be in.”
Id.
22 THOMAS, supra note 10, at 109–10.
23 Id. at 119–20.
24 Id. at 137–38.
25 Id. at 148–49.
26 Id. at 196–97, 204.
27 See generally Julian Abele Cook, Jr., Thurgood Marshall and Clarence Thomas: A
Glance at their Philosophies, 73 MICH. BAR J. 298 (1994); Maureen Dowd, Conservative
Black Judge, Clarence Thomas, Is Named to Marshall’s Court Seat, N.Y. TIMES, July 2,
1991, at A1.
28 Much has been written about Justice Thomas’s Senate confirmation hearing. It is not the
purpose of this Article to explore that history further.
17

22 NEV. L.J. 505

Spring 2022]

CHIEF JUSTICE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

511

the Supreme Court in October 1991 and is now the longest-serving member of
the Court.29
II. JUSTICE THOMAS’S ROLE IN DECIDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CASES
A. By the Numbers: Majority Opinions in Intellectual Property Cases on the
Roberts Court
The Supreme Court has not been particularly involved in intellectual property law for most of its history. Congress seemed to diminish the Supreme
Court’s role in patent law in 1982 when it created the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit with its patent-specialist judges.30 However, the Roberts
Court31 has taken a keen interest in intellectual property cases,32 firmly inserting itself into United States innovation law and policy.
The Supreme Court has decided nearly seventy intellectual property law
cases during the Roberts Court era as of December 31, 2021. In determining
whether a case was an “intellectual property law” case, I counted cases in
which a copyright, patent, trademark, or trade secret-related issue played a material role in the Court’s decision.33 This includes cases that touch on antitrust,
contract, civil procedure, and administrative law in relation to intellectual property rights.

29

See James Taranto, We May Get a Conservative Chief Justice, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 26,
2020, 6:00 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/we-may-get-a-conservative-chief-justice11603749647 [https://perma.cc/P47D-VB2J]; Linda Greenhouse, Thomas Sworn in as 106th
Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1991, at A18.
30 See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts,
64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1989); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Patent Law, the Federal Circuit, and
the Supreme Court: A Quiet Revolution, 11 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 2 (2003); Pauline Newman, The Federal Circuit in Perspective, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 821, 821, 823 (2005).
31 The Roberts Court began when John Roberts became Chief Justice in September 2005,
succeeding Chief Justice William Rehnquist. See JOAN BISKUPIC, THE CHIEF: THE LIFE AND
TURBULENT TIMES OF CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN ROBERTS 2 (2019); see also Jess Bravin & Brent
Kendall, Latest Term Shows John Roberts in Command of Shifting Coalitions, WALL ST. J.
(July 12, 2020, 1:08 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/latest-term-shows-john-roberts-incommand-of-shifting-coalitions-11594573678 [https://perma.cc/SYV8-SEX9] (“Taken together, the court’s output reflected the overarching message Chief Justice Roberts has sought
to deliver since taking the helm in 2005: The judiciary stands apart from the partisanship that
consumes its coequal branches of government, Congress and the presidency.”).
32 See Alan D. Lourie, One Judge’s Historical View of a Changing Patent World, 34
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 323, 329–30 (2019); John F. Duffy, The Federal Circuit in the Shadow
of the Solicitor General, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 518, 523–24 (2010); John F. Duffy, The
Festo Decision and the Return of the Supreme Court to the Bar of Patents, SUP. CT. REV.
273, 288 (2002).
33 This approach is consistent with Joseph Miller’s comprehensive mapping of the Supreme
Court’s intellectual property cases. See Joseph S. Miller, U.S. Supreme Court I.P. Cases,
1810–2019: Measuring and Mapping the Citation Networks, 69 CATH. U. L. REV. 537, 542–
43 (2020); Joseph S. Miller, Which Supreme Court Cases Influenced Recent Supreme Court
Decisions? A Citation Study, 21 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1, 18–19 (2017).
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As shown in the table below, Justice Thomas has written the most majority
opinions for the Roberts Court in intellectual property cases.34 When considering intellectual property majority opinions over the entire history of the Supreme Court, Justice Thomas has surpassed even Justices known for their intellectual property opinions, such as Justice Sandra Day O’Connor,35 Justice
Anthony Kennedy,36 Justice John Paul Stevens,37 and Chief Justice Warren
Burger.38 Additionally, fifteen of Justice Thomas’s opinions have been in patent law cases, which now ranks him as the top author of patent law majority
opinions in the history of the Supreme Court,39 putting him ahead of Justice

34

See infra Table 1.
See Keith Aoki, Balancing Act: Reflections on Justice O’Connor’s Intellectual Property
Jurisprudence, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 965, 966–67 (2008); Marci A. Hamilton, Justice
O’Connor’s Intellectual Property Opinions: Currents and Crosscurrents, 13 WOMEN’S RTS.
L. REP. 71, 71 (1991).
36 See Eileen Hyde, Flexible and Fact-Dependent: A Review of Justice Kennedy’s Intellectual Property Opinions, 30 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 14, 14 (2018).
37 See Pamela Samuelson, The Generativity of Sony v. Universal: The Intellectual Property
Legacy of Justice Stevens, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1831, 1831–32 (2006); Ryan Davis & Bill
Donahue, Justice Stevens Sought Careful Limits on Reach of IP Law, LAW360 (July 17,
2019, 10:09 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1179473/justice-stevens-sought-carefullimits-on-reach-of-ip-law [https://perma.cc/H9SA-C6DW].
38 See Alan D. Lourie, The Intellectual Property Contributions of Chief Justice Warren E.
Burger, 45 OKLA. L. REV. 151, 151 (1992). Chief Justice Burger wrote the majority opinion
in five intellectual property cases. See Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227
(1986) (trade secret); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (patent); Aronson v.
Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257 (1979) (patent); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416
U.S. 470 (1974) (trade secret and patent); Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973) (copyright).
39 Undoubtedly, the volume of Justice Thomas’s patent law opinions is related to the Roberts Court’s keen interest in patent law, although Justice Thomas authored two patent law
opinions of the Court during the Rehnquist Court era, including a significant opinion on the
doctrine of equivalents. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S.
17 (1997). As discussed infra Section II.B, it is possible that Justice Thomas played a role in
fueling the Roberts Court’s interest in patent cases.
35
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William O. Douglas’s fourteen patent law opinions40 and Justice Hugo
Black’s41 ten opinions.42

40

Cuno Eng’g Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84 (1941); Automatic Devices
Corp. v. Sinko Tool & Mfg. Co., 314 U.S. 94 (1941); United States v. Masonite Corp., 316
U.S. 265 (1942); Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U.S. 359 (1943); Mercoid Corp. v. MidContinent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944); Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regul.
Co., 320 U.S. 680 (1944); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Jewel Incandescent Lamp Co., 326 U.S. 242
(1945); Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637 (1947); Funk
Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948); Simpson v. Union Oil Co. of
Cal. 377 U.S. 13 (1964); Wilbur-Ellis Co. v. Kuther, 377 U.S. 422 (1964); Brulotte v. Thys
Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964); Anderson’s Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57
(1969); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). One of Justice Douglas’s fourteen opinions, Automatic Devices Corp. v. Sinko Tool & Manufacturing Co., is a very brief order in a
companion case to Cuno Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp. Nonetheless, I
counted it as a separate patent law opinion. Also, I counted Simpson v. Union Oil Co. as a
patent case even though it focused on consignment agreements under antitrust law, but the
case has a significant discussion of patent licenses.
41
Justice Black and Justice Thomas have also been linked because of their free speech jurisprudence. See Lichtman, supra note 4.
42 Shawkee Mfg. Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 271 (1944); Halliburton Oil Well
Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1 (1946); McCullough v. Kammerer Corp., 331 U.S. 96
(1947); Edward Katzinger Co. v. Chi. Metallic Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 394 (1947); Macgregor v.
Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 402 (1947); Mandel Bros., Inc. v. Wallace, 335
U.S. 291 (1948); Sanford v. Kepner, 344 U.S. 13 (1952); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stifel
Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964);
Hazeltine Rsch., Inc. v. Brenner, 382 U.S. 252 (1965).
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TABLE 1: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MAJORITY OPINIONS BY THE NUMBERS
Supreme Court
Justice

IP Majority
Opinions:
Career Total

Thomas
Ginsburg
Stevens
Breyer
Scalia
Sotomayor
Kagan
Kennedy
Roberts
O’Connor
Alito
Souter
Gorsuch
Kavanaugh

18
11
11
10
9
9
7
7
7
6
5
4
2
1

IP Majority
Opinions:
Roberts Court
Era
14
7
2
8
2
9
7
4
7
0
5
0
2
1

IP Majority
Opinions:
Rehnquist and
Burger Court Eras
4
4
9
2
7
N.A.
N.A.
3
N.A.
6
N.A.
4
N.A.
N.A.

A list of the specific cases for each Justice can be found cited in the annotated
chart in the Appendix.
B. Why Has Justice Thomas Emerged as the Roberts Court’s “Chief Justice”
of Intellectual Property Law?
The Roberts Court has no shortage of Justices with an interest in intellectual property law. Before joining the Court, Justice Breyer wrote a famous law
review article, The Uneasy Case For Copyright.43 Justice Ginsburg has been
noted for her copyright jurisprudence,44 and her daughter is Professor Jane

43

Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 345 (1970). See also Stephen Breyer, Copyright: A Rejoinder, 20 UCLA L. REV. 75 (1972); Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case
for Copyright: A Look Back over Four Decades, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1635 (2011).
44 See Ryan Vacca & Ann Bartow, Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s Copyright Jurisprudence, 22
NEV. L.J. (forthcoming 2022); see also Nicole Lamberson, The Enduring Copyright Legacy
of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, LIBR. OF CONG.: COPYRIGHT CREATIVITY AT WORK (Feb. 12,
2021),
https://blogs.loc.gov/copyright/2021/02/the-enduring-copyright-legacy-of-justiceruth-bader-ginsburg [https://perma.cc/D8CZ-AMQS]; Maria A. Pallante, Ginsburg, Scalia,
and Possibly Barrett on Copyright, ASS’N OF AM. PUBLISHERS BLOGS (Oct. 14, 2020),
https://publishers.org/ginsburg-scalia-and-possibly-barrett-on-copyright
[https://perma.cc/2F5Y-4WC6]; Samantha Levin, “It Is so Ordered”—a Look Back at Justice Ginsburg’s Copyright Legacy, COPYRIGHT ALL. BLOGS (Sept. 24, 2020),
https://copyrightalliance.org/a-look-back-at-justice-ginsburgs-copyright-legacy
[https://perma.cc/YE65-BTBJ].
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Ginsburg, one of the world’s most respected copyright law scholars.45 Justice
Sotomayor was a commercial litigation partner at a New York law firm where
she specialized in intellectual property litigation.46 She also authored a wellknown opinion on software licensing when she was sitting on the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.47 Even newcomer Justice Gorsuch has received attention
for his approach to patent cases.48 So why did Justice Thomas emerge as the
most prolific author of intellectual property opinions of the Court?49 To answer
that question, it is important to understand some fundamentals of Supreme
Court practice, especially how the Court accepts and decides cases, and how
the Court assigns and drafts its opinions. 50
Cases come to the Supreme Court’s attention when a party files a writ of
certiorari (cert petition) seeking review of a decision by a federal circuit court
of appeals or a state supreme court.51 The Supreme Court receives several
thousand cert petitions each term. From these petitions, the Court will choose
around 150 cases. Each Justice is responsible for reviewing the cert petitions,
although some Justices pool their law clerks to streamline the process by writing summaries of the facts and contentions of each petition. The Chief Justice
circulates a list of cases that the Chief Justice thinks should be considered for
acceptance, and the Associate Justices can add cases to this “discuss list” as
well. The Justices then meet to discuss and choose which cases to accept. It
takes four votes to accept a case.
Once a case is accepted by the Court, the parties (and any amici) file their
briefs according to the appointed schedule, and then the Court hears oral argument. After oral argument, the Justices meet in the Chief Justice’s conference
room to decide the case. Only the Justices are present during this conference.

45

Jane Ginsburg is the Morton L. Janklow Professor of Literary and Artistic Property Law
at Columbia Law School, where she directs the law school’s Kernochan Center for Law,
Media and the Arts. Jane C. Ginsburg, COLUM. L. SCH., https://www.law.columbia.edu/
faculty/jane-c-ginsburg [https://perma.cc/4F44-F3C7]; see Jess Bravin, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, a Pioneering Justice on Supreme Court, Dies at 87, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 19, 2020, 1:31
PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ruth-bader-ginsburg-dies-11600472623 [https://perma.c
c/V6XQ-3L64] (“Justice Ginsburg was the Court’s most aggressive defender of copyright,
for example, an interest she said she adopted from her daughter, Jane, herself an expert in
intellectual property at Columbia Law School.”).
46 Justice Sotomayor tells her story in her memoir, SONIA SOTOMAYOR, MY BELOVED
WORLD 267 (2013).
47 Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 20 (2d Cir. 2002).
48
Daniel D. Kim & Jonathan Stroud, Administrative Oversight: Justice Gorsuch’s Patent
Opinions, the PTAB, and Antagonism Toward the Administrative State, 18 CHI.-KENT J.
INTELL. PROP. L. 53, 54–55 (2019).
49 It is interesting to note, however, that Justice Sotomayor has already authored the second
most majority opinions in intellectual property cases on the Roberts Court even though she
has only been on the Court since 2009. See infra, Appendix. She is poised to become the Supreme Court’s next “chief justice” of intellectual property law.
50 See generally RICHARD SEAMON ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT SOURCEBOOK (2013).
51 See generally STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE (11th ed. 2019).
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The Chief Justice sits at one end of a rectangular table, the senior Associate
Justice (currently, Justice Thomas) sits at the opposite end, and the other Associate Justices sit on the sides in order of seniority.
The Chief Justice begins consideration of each case by reviewing the facts,
the decision of the lower court, and the applicable law. Following that review,
the Chief Justice votes to affirm or reverse the lower court and explains the
supporting rationale. The discussion and voting then proceeds down the line of
Associate Justices from the most to the least senior Justice. Typically, these are
not round table discussions with interplay between the Justices. Each Justice
simply presents his or her views without interruption. At the end of the discussion, the Chief Justice announces how the vote will be recorded.
Next comes the assignment of the opinion writing. If the Chief Justice is in
the majority, then the Chief Justice assigns the opinion; otherwise, the most
senior Associate Justice in the majority assigns the opinion. In his book on the
Supreme Court, former Chief Justice Rehnquist notes how important these assignments are to each member of the Court: “This is an important responsibility, and it is desirable that it be discharged carefully and fairly.”52 In Justice
Rehnquist’s view, the Chief Justice is expected to retain some opinions that are
of great significance but also to share the significant opinions with the other
Justices.53 Justice Rehnquist also notes that since the discussion in the conference is, by necessity, general in nature, the details of the Court’s decision often
get worked out in the writing of the opinion of the Court. And votes from the
conference can (and do) change during the opinion writing process.54
With this background in mind, why has Justice Thomas been assigned the
most intellectual property opinions in the Roberts Court era? One reason may
be that the Chief Justice knows that Justice Thomas has an interest in and experience with commercial law. At Yale Law School, Justice Thomas relished taking courses in corporate law, bankruptcy, and commercial transactions.55 He
notes in his memoir that the honors grade he received in tax law “would be my
most satisfying experience in law school.”56 Building on that interest, Justice
52

WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT: HOW IT WAS, HOW IT IS 297 (1987).
Id.
54 See Christopher B. Seaman & Sheena X. Wang, An Inside History of the Burger Court’s
Patent Eligibility Jurisprudence, 53 AKRON L. REV. 915, 922–23 (2019) (describing vote
changes in key patent cases during the Burger Court); John Eastman, Reflections on Justice
Thomas’s Twenty Years on the Bench, 88 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 691, 702 (2011) (noting
that when votes change during the drafting of the opinion of the Court, the votes normally go
down, creating a closer majority or changing a clear majority into a plurality).
55 THOMAS, supra note 10, at 75.
56 Id.
53

When Justice Thomas was at Yale Law School, he decided that avoiding constitutional law and
civil rights issues was a way to make a mark: to be treated not as a black lawyer, but as a lawyer
who happened to be black. He got into fields that were the least tied to race as you can get in order to try to establish his independence from that history, of people telling him what he ought to
be doing. And so he went into corporate law and tax law . . . .
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Thomas represented the Department of Revenue and State Tax Commission
during his time working as an associate attorney general in Missouri. Following
his stint in the Missouri attorney general’s office, he took a corporate counsel
position at Monsanto rather than go into academia or join a large law firm because of the opportunity at Monsanto to mix law and business.57 While at Monsanto he spent a considerable amount of time studying books, periodicals, and
reports about business and government policy.58 As a legislative assistant for
Senator Danforth, he worked on energy-related issues.59 Thus, Justice Thomas’s experience makes him particularly well-situated to understand and wrestle
with issues of intellectual property law and policy. Given his experience, perhaps Justice Thomas even signals his enthusiasm60 for intellectual property
cases during the Court’s consideration of the cert petition “discuss list” or in
the conferences where the Court decides its cases on the merits.61
Another reason may relate to Justice Thomas’s approach to many important constitutional issues that come before the Court. Justice Thomas’s
originalist viewpoint often puts him in dissent.62 Even if he agrees with the majority’s outcome, he often does not agree with its reasoning and thus finds himself concurring only in part of the majority opinion or only in the Court’s
judgment.63 Consequently, this narrows the number of cases in which the opinion of the Court could be assigned to Justice Thomas, since the Justice who
writes the opinion of the Court needs to reflect the views expressed at the conference by the Justices who form the majority.64 And as mentioned, many important details of the decision get worked out in the writing of the opinion. PerEastman, supra note 54, at 701. Eastman, a professor and former dean of the law school at
Chapman University, clerked for Justice Thomas from 1996 to 1997. Id.
57 THOMAS, supra note 10, at 109–10.
58 Id. at 116.
59 Id. at 123.
60 In his book on the Rehnquist Court, Mark Tushnet notes that Justice Thomas’s “willingness to handle complex cases involving statutory interpretation and economic regulation limited what he had to say about major constitutional questions in the Rehnquist years.” MARK
TUSHNET, A COURT DIVIDED: THE REHNQUIST COURT AND THE FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 103 (2005). Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1664 (2017), is a good example of
Justice Thomas construing a complex statute, the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, in an intellectual property case in the Roberts Court era.
61 The same reasoning may account for why Justice Sotomayor has authored the second
most intellectual property opinions on the Roberts Court. See infra, Appendix. This suggests
Justice Sotomayor is poised to become the Court’s next “chief justice” of intellectual property law.
62 E.g., United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 158–59 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
63 E.g., Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1007 (2020) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment); Morse v. Fredrick, 551 U.S. 393, 410 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring).
64 However, by the same logic, these cases could have been assigned to Justices Ginsburg,
Breyer, Kagan, or Sotomayor who populate the liberal wing of the Court—in other words, if
intellectual property opinions were relatively safe to assign, then Chief Justice Roberts could
have assigned them to the liberal Justices just as readily as to Justice Thomas.
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haps, then, intellectual property cases are a particular category of cases in
which Justice Thomas’s views are more likely to be in step with his colleagues.65 And to the extent certain intellectual property cases are considered
interesting or of great significance, then it would make sense for the Chief Justice to assign Justice Thomas those opinions in the course of fairly allocating
the most desirable opinions among the Justices.
A final reason may relate to Justice Thomas’s approach to writing opinions
in cases of statutory construction. Justice Thomas considers himself a textualist
in these cases. His careful application of textualism may be a particularly good
fit for the Court’s approach to deciding intellectual property cases. I explore
this reason more fully in the next Parts of this Article.
III. JUSTICE THOMAS’S KEY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW OPINIONS FOR
THE ROBERTS COURT
Congress created the Federal Circuit in 1982 to unify patent law appeals,
hoping this would improve the climate for innovation by giving inventors a
uniform body of patent law decided by judges with patent expertise.66 Over
time, however, commentators expressed concern that the Federal Circuit had
become too friendly to patent holders, turning patents from promoters of innovation to drags on innovation.67 For example, the Federal Circuit often favored
bright-line legal rules that would provide certainty for patent holders and their
lawyers but, either explicitly or implicitly, favored the interests of patent holders.68
Beginning with the eBay v. MercExchange case in 2006, the Roberts Court
began to take a particular interest in patent law and began to reset the Federal
Circuit’s patent law jurisprudence.69 This Part discusses Justice Thomas’s key
intellectual property law majority opinions as the Roberts Court became more

65

But see Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1744, 1769 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment) (finding that the disparagement clause of the Lanham Act
violates the First Amendment); Allen, 140 S. Ct. at 997, 1007 (Thomas, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment) (discussing state sovereign immunity for copyright infringement); Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1498, 1502, 1513 (2020)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (finding annotations of official state reports ineligible for copyright
protection); Google v. Oracle, 141 S. Ct. 1183, 1210 (2021) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
66 See Dreyfuss, supra note 30, at 3; Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A
Continuing Experiment in Specialization, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 769, 770 (2004); R. Polk
Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding?: An Empirical Assessment
of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1108 (2004); Newman, supra note 30, at
821.
67 See Paul M. Janicke & LiLan Ren, Who Wins Patent Infringement Cases?, 34 AIPLA
Q.J. 1, 3, 38 (2006); Kimberley A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases—an Empirical
Peek Inside the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 368–69 (2000).
68 See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415 (2007) (“We begin by rejecting the
rigid approach of the Court of Appeals.”).
69 See generally Lourie, supra note 32.
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engaged in intellectual property cases, especially in patent law.70 These opinions stand out because of their importance in the evolution of America’s information economy. And, as explained in Part IV, they highlight the fingerprint
that Justice Thomas places on intellectual property cases.
A. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006)
eBay Inc. operates a popular Internet platform for buying and selling goods
either at a fixed price or through an auction. MercExchange is a company
founded by inventor and patent attorney Thomas Woolston to commercialize
his patents.71 eBay and MercExchange attempted to negotiate a license for
Woolston’s online auction technology patents, but when negotiations broke
down, MercExchange sued eBay for patent infringement.72
A jury awarded MercExchange $30 million73 in damages, but the trial
judge denied MercExchange’s request for a permanent injunction.74 The Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the trial court’s denial of injunctive
relief, citing its “general rule” that trial courts should issue permanent injunctions against patent infringement “absent exceptional circumstances.”75 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the appropriateness of the Federal Circuit’s general rule.
Justice Thomas’s opinion for a unanimous Court began by reciting historical practice: “According to well-established principles of equity, a plaintiff
seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor test.”76 He emphasized that “[t]he decision to grant or deny permanent injunctive relief” based on
the four-factor test “is an act of equitable discretion by the district court, reviewable on appeal [only] for abuse of discretion.”77 Any major departure from
this historical practice “should not be lightly implied.”78
Justice Thomas then turned to the text of the Patent Act. He found nothing
in the Patent Act indicating that Congress intended to depart from traditional
70

During the Rehnquist Court era, his most notable intellectual property opinion was Warner-Jenkinson v. Hilton Davis Chem., 520 U.S. 17 (1997), well known for its contribution to
patent law’s doctrine of equivalents.
71 Jon Schwartz, eBay Settles Seven-Year Dispute over Patents, USA TODAY (Mar. 3, 2008,
3:21AM),
https://abcnews.go.com/Technology/story?id=4363568&page=1
[https://perma.cc/V8T6-8XAF].
72 See eBay v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388, 390 (2006).
73 Mylene Mangalindan, eBay Is Ordered to Pay $30 Million in Patent Rift, WALL ST. J.,
(Dec. 13, 2007) https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB119751056840625503 [https://perma.cc/
VND2-BQ6X]; Mark Schwanhausser, eBay Patent Case Settled, MERCURY NEWS (Feb. 28,
2008, 6:38 PM) https://www.mercurynews.com/2008/02/28/ebay-patent-case-settled-2 [htt
ps://perma.cc/LU7P-RJEY].
74 MercExchange v. eBay, 275 F. Supp. 2d 695, 722 (E.D. Va. 2003).
75 MercExchange v. eBay, 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
76 eBay, 547 U.S. at 391.
77 Id.
78 Id.
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equitable principles.79 To the contrary, the Patent Act preserved traditional equitable principles by expressly providing that injunctions “may” issue “in accordance with the principles of equity.”80 Drawing parallels with copyright law,
Justice Thomas noted that the Copyright Act takes the same approach as the
Patent Act, and, consequently, the Court has “rejected invitations to replace
traditional equitable considerations with a rule that an injunction automatically
follows” from an infringement.81
Justice Thomas rejected an argument advanced by the Federal Circuit to
justify its general rule on injunctive relief: that patents have the attributes of
personal property,82 including the right to exclude others from making, using,
and selling an invention.83 That is true, acknowledged Justice Thomas, but the
creation of a right is different than provision of a remedy.84 Moreover, even
though patents have attributes of personal property, the Patent Act provides that
patents-as-property are “subject to the provisions of this title,” including the
provision that injunctive relief may only issue in accordance with traditional
principles of equity.85
Finally, Justice Thomas turned to the disposition of the case. In doing so,
he corrected the approach of both the district court and the Federal Circuit. The
trial court erred by creating certain categorical exclusions—namely, that injunctions could not issue in certain categories of cases because, according to
the trial court, the patent holder would never suffer irreparable harm in those
contexts.86 For example, the trial court had singled out cases in which the plaintiff had offered to license its patents or did not practice its patents.87 But according to Justice Thomas, no such categorical rules are permitted by traditional equitable principles, and they cannot be squared with principles of equity
adopted by Congress in the Patent Act. To illustrate his point, he noted that
university patent holders and self-made inventors may reasonably prefer licensing their patents to making and selling products, and he suggested that such patent holders may sometimes be able to satisfy the traditional four-factor test.88
As for the Federal Circuit, it departed from the traditional four-part test by
establishing a rule unique to patent cases.89 Under the Federal Circuit’s patent
exceptionalism, injunctions should only be denied in rare, exceptional, or unu-

79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89

Id. at 391–92.
35 U.S.C. § 283.
eBay, 547 U.S. at 392–93.
35 U.S.C. § 261.
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1).
eBay, 547 U.S. at 392.
See id.
Id. at 393.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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sual cases.90 Justice Thomas concluded that “[j]ust as the District Court erred in
its categorical denial of injunctive relief, the Court of Appeals erred in its categorical grant of such relief.”91
The Court remanded the case to the district court, expressly taking no position on whether the trial court should issue a permanent injunction.92 Indeed,
Justice Thomas emphasized that the Court was taking no position about whether a permanent injunction would be issued “in any number of disputes arising
under the Patent Act.”93 However, the Court did provide signals about future
cases through dueling concurring opinions authored by Chief Justice Roberts
(joined by Justices Scalia and Ginsburg) and Justice Kennedy (joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer).
Chief Justice Roberts noted that since the early nineteenth century, courts
had granted injunctive relief in the vast majority of patent cases, and, while this
did not justify a general rule, the historical practice should be given serious
consideration by trial judges to “promote the basic principle of justice that like
cases should be decided alike.”94 Justice Kennedy agreed that historical practice might be instructive when a modern case bears substantial parallels to prior
cases. But, he cautioned, “in many instances the nature of the patent being enforced” (e.g., business method patents and component patents) and “the economic function of the patent holder” (e.g., nonpracticing entities) might present
“considerations quite unlike earlier cases.”95
The Significance of eBay
One of Justice Thomas’s first intellectual property opinions for the Roberts
Court is also one of the most important.96 The Court decided eBay at a time
when commentators were raising concerns about patent owners who acquire
patents simply to monetize them (often called nonpracticing entities, patent
holding companies, or, less generously, patent trolls).97 Since a nonpracticing
entity (NPE) makes and sells no products, it has a single-minded focus on collecting royalties and never faces a threat of a patent countersuit. Thus, in the
hands of an NPE, a patent appears to be a pernicious monopoly, far removed
from the constitutional goal of promoting innovation.
90

Id. at 394.
Id.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 395 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
95 See id. at 395–96 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
96 Within four years of the eBay decision, the case had been cited more than 4,000 times.
See Ryan T. Holte, Clarity in Remedies for Patent Cases, 26 GEO. MASON L. REV. 127, 127
(2018).
97 See Robin C. Feldman & Mark A. Lemley, The Sound and Fury of Patent Activity, 103
MINN. L. REV. 1793, 1794–95 (2019); Collen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup,
the ITC, and the Public Interest, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 2 (2012).
91
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NPEs come in various shapes and sizes. When people think of NPEs, they
tend to think of patent licensing firms such as Intellectual Ventures or Uniloc.98
However, since passage of the Bayh-Dole Act, many research universities (private and public) have become large and often powerful patent holders and licensors.99 Small inventors can also be NPEs. These inventors often have no interest in or aptitude for commercializing their inventions and therefore rely on
patent licensing as the way to productize their patents and receive compensation for their inventive work. Sometimes, universities and small inventors engage NPEs such as Intellectual Ventures as an agent to license their patents.
They do so because licensing activities, such as finding and contacting potential licensees, negotiating and drafting license contracts, and monitoring and
collecting royalties, can be time consuming and resource intensive.100
One of the biggest weapons that an NPE can wield is the prospect of obtaining injunctive relief, especially a permanent injunction. It is sobering to pay
money for patent royalties, to be sure, but even more disconcerting for a company to face disruption of its product development and distribution. The Federal Circuit’s injunction-presumed general rule made the threat of injunctive relief particularly acute.
Justice Thomas’s rejection of the Federal Circuit’s general rule on patent
injunctions significantly ratcheted back the threat of injunctive relief posed by
NPEs,101 thus greatly reducing their bargaining power.102 Many commentators
have applauded that result from a policy standpoint, arguing that the eBay decision restores patents to their proper role in promoting innovation rather than
thwarting it.103 While cutting back the power of NPEs, however, Justice Thom-

98

See generally Mark A. Lemley & Nathan Myhrvold, How to Make a Patent Market, 36
HOFSTRA L. REV. 257 (2007).
99 See Peter Lee, Patents and the University, 63 DUKE L.J. 1, 31–32 (2013).
100 See Sean O’Connor, The Use of MTAs to Control Commercialization of Stem Cell Diagnostics and Therapeutics, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1017, 1027–28 (2006). Most major research universities have a technology transfer office, but these offices tend to be resource
constrained and cannot handle a large volume of patent licensing activity. See Hans
Wiesendanger, A History of OTL, STAN. UNIV.: OFF. OF TECH. LICENSING,
https://otl.stanford.edu/history-otl [https://perma.cc/9XB5-NNCA].
101 See James M. Fisher, The “Right” to Injunctive Relief for Patent Infringement, 24 SANTA
CLARA COMPUT. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 25 (2007) (“The strongest case for injunctive relief is
when [a] patentee is or will soon be practicing the patent.”).
102 See Holte, supra note 96, at 128; Christopher B. Seaman, Permanent Injunctions in Patent Litigation After eBay: An Empirical Study, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1949, 1952, 1970 (2016).
103 See, e.g., Seaman, supra note 102, at 2002; Sarah R. Wasserman Rajec, Tailoring Remedies to Spur Innovation, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 733, 735–36 (2012); Mark P. Gergen et al., The
Supreme Court’s Accidental Revolution? The Test for Permanent Injunctions, 112 COLUM.
L. REV. 203, 244 (2012). But see Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Supreme Court Engages
in Judicial Activism in Interpreting the Patent Law in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 10
TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 165, 202 (2007) (arguing that the eBay decision ignores the
Court’s prior decisions and constitutional limitations). See also Elizabeth A. Rowe, eBay,
Permanent Injunctions, and Trade Secrets, 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 553 (2020); Pamela
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as left the door open for NPEs to obtain injunctive relief if they can convince a
trial court that that makes sense. Justice Thomas does not say “never,” but he
does say “prove it.” This nuanced approach104 gives courts agility to adapt as
the technology sector evolves. In other words, perhaps a good-for-innovation
NPE can get an injunction, but a bad-for-innovation NPE cannot.105
On top of the concerns about NPEs, the Court decided eBay amidst concerns about business method patents, sparked by Amazon’s attempt to enforce
its “One Click” patent.106 To detractors, business method patents are the epitome of junk patents; to supporters, they recognize the importance and value of
business model innovation. The eBay decision took the sting out of business
method patents in the same way it took the sting out of NPEs. Inventors can
still get business method patents, but the eBay decision reduced the practical
power of those patents.
The eBay case is also important because it launched the Supreme Court’s
campaign to reset the Federal Circuit’s patent law jurisprudence.107 Justice
Thomas’s opinion for the Court in eBay rejected the Federal Circuit’s patent
exceptionalism. In the coming years, the Court would reject the Federal Circuit’s patent exceptionalism time after time, following Justice Thomas’s approach in eBay.108
Despite the focus on patent law, Justice Thomas’s opinion looked across
different types of intellectual property law for guiding principles. In doing so,
he followed the Court’s approach in cases such as Sony Corp. v. Universal City
Studios, in which the Court looked to patent law’s staple-article-in-commerce
Samuelson, Withholding Injunctions in Copyright Cases: The Impact of eBay, 63 WM. &
MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2021).
104 Ryan Holte provides an alternative explanation of the Court’s nuanced approach, arguing
that it may indicate that the Supreme Court did not intend for the case to have such a grand
impact. See Holte, supra note 96, at 161; see also Gergen et al., supra note 103, at 244.
However, as I argue, infra Section IV.F., Justice Thomas seems acutely aware of the important role that remedies can play in intellectual property cases.
105 See Gergen et al., supra note 103, at 244–45 (arguing that the actual practice of district
courts substantially conforms to the Supreme Court’s admonition against a categorical rule).
106 See Troy Wolverton, Amazon, Barnes & Noble Settle Patent Suit, CNET NEWS (Mar. 6,
2002, 7:40 PM), https://web.archive.org/web/20090730055049/http://news.cnet.com/21001017-854105.html [https://perma.cc/PS3Z-W4RX]. The United States Patent Office issued a
patent for the one-click technique to Amazon in September 1999. U.S. Patent No. 5960411
(issued Sept. 28, 1999). Amazon filed a patent infringement lawsuit in October 1999 when
Barnes & Noble offered an ordering option called “Express Lane.” Leslie Kaufman, Amazon
Sues Big Bookseller over System for Shopping, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1999, at C1. The parties
settled the lawsuit in 2002. Wolverton, supra. Amazon’s one-click patent expired in 2017.
See Amazon’s Patent on One-Click Payments to Expire, INSIDER (Jan. 5, 2017, 8:43 AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/amazons-patent-on-one-click-payments-to-expire-2017-1
[https://perma.cc/25L6-ZDHH]. See generally Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010) (addressing business method patents).
107 See generally Lourie, supra note 32.
108 See, e.g., KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 427–28 (2007); Microsoft Corp.
v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 458–59 (2007); MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentec, Inc., 549 U.S.
118, 136–37 (2007).
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doctrine to develop an approach to copyright contributory infringement.109 This
approach has the virtue of unifying intellectual property law and practice,
which can be especially useful for products such as software,110 which may be
covered by multiple types of intellectual property.111
B. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008)
LG Electronics (LGE) is a large computer technology firm with an extensive patent portfolio covering computer systems.112 Like many such companies,
LGE enters into patent portfolio cross-license agreements with other computer
technology firms. These agreements vary in scope. Some cover all patents
across all technologies, but others exclude certain technologies or fields of use
or limit the ability to shield certain partners or customers from patent claims.113
Sometimes, the license scope comes down to financial considerations. For example, a company will calculate whether it makes good business sense to pay
to shield its downstream customers (and incorporate that expense into the
product purchase price) or let its customers pay for the patent rights on their
own.114
LGE had a patent portfolio cross-license agreement with microprocessor
powerhouse Intel.115 In that agreement, LGE granted Intel the right to make,
use, and sell its microprocessors and chipsets under LGE’s entire portfolio of
computer system patents. However, the license grant contained an important
downstream shielding carve-out: it did not cover any computer manufacturer
who combined Intel products with non-Intel products.116 This exception made
sound business sense. A number of Intel’s customers neither needed nor wanted to pay for downstream shielding because they either had their own patent
portfolio cross license with LGE, or their computer systems did not infringe
LGE’s patents.
109

Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984); see also GlobalTech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754 (2011) (looking to copyright law to determine mental state for induced infringement in patent law); Octane Fitness, LLC v. Icon
Health & Fitness, Inc., 572 U.S. 545 (2014) (drawing on copyright law to determine attorneys’ fees in patent case).
110 See generally ROBERT W. GOMULKIEWICZ, SOFTWARE LAW AND ITS APPLICATION (2d ed.
2018).
111 See Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1532 (2017); see also
Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Is the License Still the Product?, 60 ARIZ. L. REV. 425, 430
(2018).
112 See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, The Federal Circuit’s Licensing Law Jurisprudence: Its
Nature and Influence, 84 WASH. L. REV. 199, 233 (2009). Like many computer-technology
companies, some of LGE’s patents cover the inventions of its employees, and other patents
are purchased from third parties. The patents in suit in the Quanta case had been purchased
by LGE. Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 621 (2008).
113 Gomulkiewicz, supra note 112, at 233.
114 Id.
115 Quanta, 553 U.S. at 623.
116 Id.
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There were two other notable aspects of the patent agreements between
LGE and Intel. First, the patent cross-license agreement contained a provision
that the agreement did not “in any way limit or alter the effect of patent exhaustion that would otherwise apply.”117 Second, in a separate but related Master
Agreement, Intel agreed that it would give notice to its customers that they
were not licensed to practice LGE’s patents in combinations of Intel and nonIntel products.118
Quanta Computer manufactures a variety of computer products that are
sold under the brands of other companies.119 According to some sources, nearly
one out of every three laptop PCs sold worldwide was manufactured by Quanta.120 Quanta builds its computer systems by assembling a variety of third-party
components, including microprocessors and chipsets from Intel.121 Intel provided notice to Quanta that Intel’s sale of microprocessors and chipsets did not
shield Quanta from LGE’s patents for any computer systems that Quanta created by combining Intel products with non-Intel parts.122
LGE sued Quanta, claiming that Quanta infringed LGE’s computer system
patents by combining Intel products with non-Intel memory123 and buses.124
Quanta raised patent exhaustion as a defense. Specifically, Quanta argued that
its purchase of Intel microprocessors and chipsets extinguished LGE’s right to
exclude Quanta from combining the Intel products with other components for
use in and sale of its computer systems.
The district court granted summary judgment to Quanta, ruling that the
LGE-Intel patent cross license shielded any legitimate purchaser of Intel products from patent infringement.125 Even though the Intel products did not fully
practice the LGE patents at issue, the Intel products had no reasonable noninfringing use except combined in a computer system, so Intel’s sale exhausted
LGE’s patent rights.126 However, the district court later limited its ruling in a
significant way: it ruled that patent exhaustion applies only to apparatus or
117

Id.
Id. at 623–24. Intel likely agreed to provide this notice both because LGE requested it
and because it might prevent a claim that Intel was inducing or contributing to infringement.
119 See About Quanta: Company Profile, QUANTA, https://www.quantatw.com/Quanta/eng
lish/about/company.aspx [https://perma.cc/L6Y7-5H4H].
120 See HELEEN MEES, THE CHINESE BIRDCAGE: HOW CHINA’S RISE ALMOST TOPPLED THE
WEST 27 (2016) (ebook); see also Product Information: Notebook PC, QUANTA,
https://www.quantatw.com/Quanta/english/product/qci_nb.aspx
[https://perma.cc/J44A7Y2F] (stating that the top ten PC companies in the world all use Quanta’s services).
121 Quanta, 553 U.S. at 624.
122 Id.
123 Id. A computer memory refers to hardware that stores data, such as a hard drive or random-access memory (RAM).
124 Id. A computer bus is a communication system that transfers data between components
in a computer system or between computer systems. Id. at 621.
125 LG Elecs., Inc. v. Asustek Comput., Inc., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1589, 1600–01 (N.D.
Cal. 2002).
126 Id. at 1598–1600.
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composition of matter patent claims and does not apply to process or method
patent claims. Because the LGE patents included method claims, patent exhaustion did not apply, and thus, Quanta’s defense ultimately failed.127
The Federal Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. It agreed with the
district court that the defense of patent exhaustion does not apply to method
claims.128 But it did not agree that Intel’s sale to Quanta exhausted LGE’s patents because the LGE-Intel cross license did not license Intel for combinations
of Intel and non-Intel components.129 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
address “whether patent exhaustion applies to the sale of components of a patented system that must be combined with additional components in order to
practice the patented methods.”130 The United States Solicitor General and several amicus briefs urged the Court to use the Quanta case to overturn the entire
line of Federal Circuit cases, beginning in 1992 with Mallinkrodt v. Medipart,
that established the Federal Circuit’s distinctive patent exhaustion jurisprudence.131
Justice Thomas’s opinion for a unanimous Court addressed the two main
issues in the case: (1) whether patent exhaustion applies to method patent
claims, and (2) whether Intel’s sale to Quanta exhausted LGE’s patents.
As to the first issue, Justice Thomas observed that a method patent may indeed be embodied in a product and that the Court had never distinguished between types of patent claims for purposes of patent exhaustion.132 To the contrary, the “Court ha[d] repeatedly held that method patents were exhausted by
the sale of an item that embodied the method.”133 Justice Thomas then turned to
a deeply practical, real-world reason why these precedents rested “on solid
footing.”134 He noted that apparatus claims and method claims are nearly alike
and often difficult to distinguish.135 Consequently, a clever patent drafter could
avoid exhaustion by simply describing a method instead of an apparatus or by
including a method claim when a machine performs a task.136
But then, Justice Thomas needed to address a complication: sales of a
component article normally do not trigger patent exhaustion in the complete
article, so why did sale of Intel’s microprocessors and chipsets exhaust patents
related to Quanta’s complete computer system? A key issue was the extent to
127

LG Elecs., Inc. v. Asustek Comput., Inc., 248 F. Supp. 2d 912, 918 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
LG Elecs., Inc. v. Bizcom Elecs., Inc., 453 F.3d 1364, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
129 Id.
130 Quanta Comput., Inc., v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 621 (2008).
131 Mallinkrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 703–09 (Fed. Cir. 1992); see also B.
Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Lab’ys, 124 F.3d 1419, 1423–27 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Monsanto Co.
v. McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336, 1341–42 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d
1328, 1335–39 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
132 Quanta, 553 U.S. at 628–29.
133 Id. at 629.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 629–30.
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which a component embodies the patents in suit. To address that issue, Justice
Thomas looked to the Court’s then-most recent patent exhaustion case, United
States v. Univis Lens Co.137 Univis held that if a component’s only reasonable
and intended use is to practice the patent, then that component embodies the
patent.138 Justice Thomas observed that the only reasonable use of Intel’s microprocessors and chipsets was to incorporate them into computer systems that
practiced LGE patents. “[H]ere, as in Univis, the only apparent object of Intel’s
sales to Quanta was to permit Quanta to incorporate the Intel [p]roducts into
computers that would practice the [LGE] patents.”139
According to Justice Thomas, Univis also found that a component sufficiently embodies a patented invention for purposes of patent exhaustion if the
component embodies the essential features of the invention.140 In this case, everything inventive about the LGE patents in suit was embodied in Intel’s microprocessors and chipsets. “Intel all but practiced the patent itself by designing its
products to practice the patents, lacking only the addition of standard parts.”141
Having concluded that Intel products sufficiently embodied LGE’s patents,
Justice Thomas turned to whether Intel’s sale to Quanta exhausted LGE’s patents. Justice Thomas began with an important admonition from Univis: exhaustion is triggered only by a sale authorized by the patent holder.142 LGE had
argued that Intel’s sale to Quanta was not authorized because the LGE-Intel patent cross license did not permit Intel to sell its products for use in combination
with non-Intel products to practice LGE’s patents.143
To assess LGE’s argument, Justice Thomas looked closely at the patent
cross-license agreement between LGE and Intel. The license grant broadly
permitted Intel to make, use, or sell products.144 Nothing in the agreement restricted Intel’s right to sell microprocessors and chipsets to purchasers who intended to combine them with non-Intel parts.145 In other words, Intel could sell
its products to anyone, but some sales were not shielded from LGE patents. To
be sure, the Master Agreement required Intel to give notice to its customers that
LGE was not licensing them to combine Intel and non-Intel parts, but LGE’s
license to Intel was not conditioned on the notice requirement or a customer’s
decision to abide by it.146 Indeed, LGE did not claim that breach of the Master
Agreement constituted a breach of the cross-license agreement.147 As a conse137
138
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140
141
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147

Id. at 627; United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942).
Quanta, 553 U.S. at 629–30.
Id. at 631–32.
Id. at 633.
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Id. at 621.
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quence, Intel’s sale to Quanta was an authorized sale of microprocessors and
chipsets, and, since Intel’s products substantially embodied LGE’s patents, the
sale exhausted LGE’s right to exclude under patent law.148 The only remaining
claim might have been for breach of contract, but LGE had not pled that claim,
so Justice Thomas expressed no opinion on whether contract damages might be
available even when patent damages are not.149
The Significance of Quanta
The Quanta case marked the Supreme Court’s return to its patent exhaustion jurisprudence for the first time in over sixty-five years.150 It also marked
the Court’s first comment on the Federal Circuit’s patent exhaustion jurisprudence, which had been evolving in the Federal Circuit for over twenty-five
years.151 Indeed, the Court’s most recent patent exhaustion case, Impression
Products v. Lexmark, asserted that Quanta had “settled” any “lingering doubt”
about the Supreme Court’s approach to patent exhaustion.152
Yet, one of the significant aspects of the Quanta opinion—and I would argue one of its virtues—is that Justice Thomas did not attempt to proactively
settle patent exhaustion issues for every context in which they may arise.153
Justice Thomas’s careful reading of the complex contract documents used by
LGE, Intel, and Quanta revealed that the parties had not successfully made Intel’s sale to Quanta unauthorized. Justice Thomas allowed sophisticated parties
to architect their contractual relations in ways that made the most sense given
the business context. Indeed, this approach was consistent with the Court’s approach in a case that pre-dates Univis: General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co.154 At the end of the day, Justice Thomas’s approach left ample
room for business model innovation by sticking closely to the facts of the case.
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Id. at 637–38.
Id. at 637 n.7.
150 United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942).
151 See Mallinkrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992); B. Braun Med.,
Inc. v. Abbott Lab’ys, 124 F.3d 1419 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 363
F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
152 Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1533 (2017).
153 See generally Andrew T. Dufrense, The Exhaustion Doctrine Revisited? Assessing the
Scope and Possible Effects of the Supreme Court’s Quanta Decision, 24 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 11 (2009); Seth Jaffe, Manufacturing a System of Remanufacturing: How the Patent Office Can Facilitate Environmentally Conscious Product Design, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 919
(2011); William LaFuze et al., The Conditional Sale Doctrine in a Post-Quanta World and
Its Implications on Modern Licensing Agreements, 11 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L.
295 (2011); Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Sale Restraints and Competitive Harm: The First
Sale Doctrine in Perspective, 66 NYU ANN. SURV. AM. L. 487 (2011); Alfred C. Server &
William J. Casey, Contract-Based Post-Sale Restrictions on Patented Products Following
Quanta, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 561 (2013).
154 See Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Co., 305 U.S. 124 (1938).
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The virtue of Justice Thomas’s careful approach could be seen three years
later in Bowman v. Monsanto.155 In that case, the Court considered the patent
exhaustion doctrine in the context of Monsanto’s sale of its patented Roundup
Ready soybean seeds. Monsanto’s end user license agreement for its seeds
permitted their use for only one growing season.156 When Mr. Bowman violated Monsanto’s license by planting seeds, Monsanto sued for patent infringement, and Bowman raised patent exhaustion as a defense.157 When the case
reached the Federal Circuit, the court rejected Mr. Bowman’s defense, citing its
Mallinkrodt v. Medipart line of cases.158
Justice Kagan’s opinion for the Court rejected Mr. Bowman’s patent exhaustion defense and affirmed the Federal Circuit’s judgment.159 Justice Kagan’s opinion, like Justice Thomas’s opinion in Quanta, paid close attention to
the context. The patent exhaustion doctrine only applies to the patent holder’s
right to control use. In substance, the restriction in Monsanto’s license agreement touched on the “make” right in patent law rather than the “use” right, thus
eliminating the possibility of a patent exhaustion defense.160 Like Justice
Thomas’s approach in Quanta, Justice Kagan’s opinion expressly noted that it
was limited to the facts before it and did not prejudge how the doctrine of patent exhaustion would apply in other technological contexts.161
Justice Thomas’s approach in Quanta can be contrasted with the approach
used by Chief Justice Roberts in Impression Products v. Lexmark.162 The Impression Products opinion used sweeping language to assert that restraints on
alienation are always “hateful” and “obnoxious” to the public interest163 and
that end user licensing “clogs the channels of commerce,” which is necessarily
magnified as the complexity of technology and supply chains advance.164 Patent exhaustion is important for innovation and consumer welfare, to be sure,
but so are the various business models that technology companies use to develop products and bring them to market.165 The Impression Products opinion
raised doubts about whether the Court has left adequate breathing space for

155

Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 569 U.S. 278 (2013).
Id. at 281.
157 Id. at 282–83.
158 Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1347–48 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
159 Bowman, 569 U.S. at 289.
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161 Id. at 289.
162 Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523 (2017).
163 Id. at 1532.
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165 See generally ROBERT W. GOMULKIEWICZ ET AL., LICENSING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
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business model innovation in the information economy.166 For instance, the
broad and breezy language used by Chief Justice Roberts in Impression Products could prove troublesome for business models in the software industry.167
Justice Thomas’s careful and measured approach in Quanta, by contrast, encouraged sophisticated parties168 in the software industry to structure economically optimal business relationships.169
C. Association for Molecular Biology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576
(2013)
Myriad Genetics is one of the world’s first genomics companies.170 Its
products include molecular diagnostic tests for hereditary cancer, urological
cancer, autoimmune disorders, depression, and other diseases.171 During its research and development, Myriad discovered the precise location and sequence
of the human genes that, when certain mutations occur, can substantially increase the risks of breast and ovarian cancer. These genes are known as
BRCA1 and BRCA2.172 Scientists knew that heredity played a role in the risk
of developing breast and ovarian cancer prior to Myriad’s discovery, but no
one had identified the genes associated with those cancers.173 Myriad’s discoveries allowed it to develop medical tests used by medical professionals to help
assess whether a patient has an increased risk of cancer by detecting the applicable BRCA mutations in a patient’s genes.174
Myriad obtained several composition-of-matter patents based on its discovery of BRCA1 and BRCA2.175 Some of the claims in the patents gave Myriad the exclusive right to isolate an individual’s BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes by
breaking the bonds that connect the DNA to the rest of the individual’s genome. Other patent claims gave Myriad the exclusive right to synthetically cre166

See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Reasonable Patent Exhaustion, 35 YALE J. REG. 513, 513
(2018) (“Impression Products reveals an economic deficiency that manifests all too frequently when patent law is brought to bear on market practices.”).
167 See generally Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, supra note 111.
168 Intel, LGE, and Quanta Computer are all sophisticated companies, like most litigants in
technology licensing cases.
169 See David McGowan, The Unfallen Sky, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 337, 373–74 (2013) (highlighting the risk of legal rules that limit freedom to choose approaches that suit particular
business needs).
170 History,
MYRIAD GENETICS, https://myriad.com/about-myriad/inside-myriad/history
[https://perma.cc/N3ZF-K4RL].
171 Myriad Genetic Tests, MYRIAD GENETICS, https://myriad.com/products-services/allproducts/overview [https://perma.cc/D8X6-VPSU].
172 See Jorge L. Contreras, Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics: A Critical Reassessment, 27 MICH. TECH. L. REV. 1, 4–9 (2020).
173 See generally KEVIN DAVIES & MICHAEL WHITE, BREAKTHROUGH: THE RACE TO FIND
THE BREAST CANCER GENE (1996); MICHAEL WALDHOLZ, CURING CANCER: THE STORY OF
THE MEN AND WOMEN UNLOCKING THE SECRETS OF OUR DEADLIEST ILLNESS (1999).
174 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 582–83 (2013).
175 Id. at 583.
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ate BRCA cDNA. When competitors began offering BRCA-based genetic testing, Myriad asserted its patents against them.176 Eventually, a group of physicians, medical patients, and advocacy groups filed a petition for declaratory
judgment challenging several of Myriad’s patents.177 The district court granted
summary judgment to the petitioners, ruling that Myriad’s patents were products of nature and thus invalid subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101178. The
Federal Circuit reversed, ruling that Myriad’s discoveries were patent eligible
under § 101.179
Justice Thomas’s opinion for the Court began by quoting the relevant text
of 35 U.S.C. § 101, which describes patent-eligible subject matter, such as new
and useful compositions of matter.180 Next, Justice Thomas noted an important,
long-held, Court-developed implicit exception to § 101: no one can patent laws
of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas. Without this exception, Justice
Thomas noted, patents could tie up the basic tools of invention and thereby inhibit innovation rather than foster it.181 That said, all inventions at some level
embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or
abstract ideas, so the Court should be cautious about interpreting the exception
too broadly. Thus, Justice Thomas emphasized, patent law must strike a delicate balance between creating exclusive-rights incentives that lead to innovation and impeding the flow of information that spurs innovation.182
Turning to Myriad’s patents in suit, Justice Thomas noted that for some of
the patents, Myriad’s principal contribution was uncovering the precise location and genetic sequence of the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes.183 Fundamentally,
Myriad did not create or alter any of the genetic information encoded in the
genes. At most, Myriad separated the gene from its surrounding genetic material, but that, Justice Thomas observed, is not an act of invention.184 Thus, these
patents were invalid because they covered a product of nature. Groundbreaking
discovery alone, Justice Thomas observed, is not enough to satisfy § 101 patent
eligibility.185
However, other Myriad patents in suit covered synthetically created
cDNA.186 cDNA differs from natural DNA in that its creation results in a mole176

Id. at 585.
Id. at 586.
178 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Pat. and Trademark Off., 702 F. Supp. 2d 181,
238 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
179 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Pat. and Trademark Off., 653 F.3d 1329, 1333–34
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (affirming the district court’s ruling on standing, but reversing on the merits
of the patent infringement case).
180 Myriad, 569 U.S. at 589.
181 Id. at 589.
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cule that is not naturally occurring. Since cDNA is not naturally occurring, the
Court ruled that it does not present the same obstacles to patentability as naturally occurring DNA.187
Before concluding the opinion of the Court, Justice Thomas made several
important clarifications. First, he clarified that the case before the Court only
involved composition of matter patent claims. It did not involve method patent
claims or any claims involving the application of knowledge about BRCA1 and
BRCA2.188 Second, he clarified that the case did not involve patent claims for
altered DNA.189
The Significance of Myriad
As mentioned previously, after more than two decades of decisions with
little Supreme Court intervention, commentators began to criticize the Federal
Circuit as too patent friendly. Justice Thomas’s eBay decision marked the beginning of the Supreme Court’s reset of the Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence.
Following eBay, the Court in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc. adjusted
the Federal Circuit’s approach to assessing whether an invention is “obvious”
to someone skilled in the art, thus making it easier to challenge a patent on that
basis.190
Then, in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories,191 the
Court began to re-shape the Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence on patent eligibility, which is one of the most significant issues in patent law.192 In doing so, the
Court highlighted the importance of its longstanding implicit exceptions to
§ 101 patent eligibility: laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.
The Court in Mayo ruled that a personalized medicine dosing process invented
by Prometheus was not eligible for patent protection because the process was
effectively an unpatentable law of nature.193 Myriad followed right on the heels
of Mayo, illustrating how natural phenomena, like laws of nature, can limit patent eligibility.194
187

Id. at 594.
Id. at 595–96.
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190 KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 420 (2007).
191 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Lab’ys, Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012).
192 See generally John M. Golden, Flook Says One Thing, Diehr Says Another: A Need for
Housecleaning in the Law of Patent Eligible Subject Matter, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1765
(2014); Jacob M. Sherkow, The Natural Complexity of Patent Eligibility, 99 IOWA L. REV.
1137 (2014).
193 See generally Contreras, supra note 172; Dan L. Burk, The Curious Incident of the Supreme Court in Myriad Genetics, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 505, 513–20 (2014).
194 Myriad, 569 U.S. at 589. The Court’s approach in Myriad runs counter to an approach
adopted by Federal Circuit judges, such as Judge Newman and then-Chief Judge Rader, and
promoted by the government in Mayo to use the implicit exceptions as a coarse, rather than a
fine, sieve for screening out unworthy cases, and then to use §§ 102, 103, and 112 to sift out
bad patents. See id.
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As Justice Thomas explained in his Myriad opinion, underlying the Court’s
focus on patent eligibility is a deep concern that patenting basic research tools
will impede innovation.195 That concern takes on particular urgency in the context of human health when people can benefit from new or more cost-effective
treatments based on breakthroughs in the biological sciences. To be sure, the
Court sees the value of patent-based incentives to perform the research and development necessary to create products to treat diseases such as breast cancer.
At the same time, however, the Court does not want the patent monopoly to
create a barrier to follow-on innovation or impede access to treatment or drive
prices for treatments too high.196 The world seems poised for a biotechnology
and biomedical revolution—and the Supreme Court wants to make sure that
patent law does not stand in the way of it.197
D. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014)
Alice Corporation is an Australian company that describes itself as an innovator in derivatives markets.198 Derivatives are financial contracts, settled at
some point in the future, where the contract’s value at settlement depends on
the value of another financial instrument or economic index. The “Alice Market” is Alice’s end-user-driven electronic platform for the creation, administration, and settlement of derivatives.199 Alice acquired U.S. patents on methods,
systems, and computer programs related to its Alice Market design.200 When
CLS Bank International began operating a specialist foreign exchange settlement utility, Alice contacted CLS about potential infringement of Alice’s patents. In 2017, CLS filed a declaratory judgment action, challenging Alice’s patents.201
The district court granted summary judgment for CLS, ruling that all of Alice’s patent claims were ineligible because they were essentially an abstract
idea.202 After a divided Federal Circuit panel reversed the district court, the
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197 See generally Arti K. Rai, Diagnostic Patents at the Supreme Court, 18 MARQ. INTELL.
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Federal Circuit vacated the panel opinion and granted rehearing en banc.203 In a
one-paragraph per curiam opinion, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district
court, with the Federal Circuit judges filing an array of concurring and dissenting opinions.204
Just as in Myriad, Justice Thomas’s opinion for the Court in Alice began by
quoting the relevant text of 35 U.S.C. § 101 and then noting the Court’s implicit exception to § 101 that no one can patent laws of nature, natural phenomena,
or abstract ideas.205 This exception, Justice Thomas noted, is needed to prevent
patents from preempting fields of endeavor or from tying up the basic tools of
scientific and technological work. However, Justice Thomas observed, all inventions at some level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature,
natural phenomena, or abstract ideas, so the Court should “tread carefully in
construing this exclusionary principle lest it swallow all of patent law.”206 In
applying the § 101 exception, Justice Thomas emphasized, the Court must distinguish between patents that claim the building blocks of ingenuity and those
that integrate the building blocks into something more, thereby transforming
them into a patent-eligible invention.207
Justice Thomas stated that the Court in Mayo had laid out a “framework”
for making this distinction.208 He described that framework as follows: “First,
we determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those patentineligible concepts.”209 To answer that question, the Court “consider[s] the elements of each claim both individually and ‘as an ordered combination’ to determine whether the additional elements ‘transform the nature of the claim’ into
a patent-eligible application.”210 Then, step two of this analysis is a search for
an “inventive concept.”211 That is, an element or combination of elements that
is “sufficient to ensure that the patent amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.”212
Justice Thomas turned to an assessment of Alice’s patent claims using the
Mayo framework. He noted that Alice’s patents were drawn to the concept of
using intermediated settlement, which the Court in Bilski v. Kappos had concluded was a fundamental economic practice and thus an abstract idea.213 This
CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp., 685 F.3d 1341, 1356 (Fed. Cir.), reh’g en banc granted,
opinion vacated, 484 F. App’x 559 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
204 CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Alice Corp., 573
U.S. at 214–15 (describing the various Federal Circuit concurring and dissenting opinions).
205 Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 216.
206 Id. at 217.
207 Id.
208 Id. Justice Breyer wrote the Court’s opinion in Mayo. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Lab’ys, Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 70 (2012).
209 Id.
210 Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78–79).
211 Id.
212 Id. at 217–18 (alteration in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 73).
213 Id. at 219.
203
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allowed Justice Thomas to move easily to the second step of the Mayo framework, which searches for an inventive concept. He concluded that, viewed as a
whole, the claims in Alice’s patent simply recited the basic concept of intermediated settlement as performed by a generic computer. And according to Justice
Thomas, adding performance on a generic computer did not add anything of
substance to transform the abstract idea into a patentable invention.214 In Mayo,
the Court ruled that adding “apply it” to an abstract idea was not an inventive
concept; in Alice, the Court ruled that adding “computerize it” is also not inventive enough for patent eligibility.215
The Significance of Alice
The Alice case is arguably one of the Court’s most significant intellectual
property cases because it changed the way patent prosecutors, patent examiners, patent litigators, and judges in patent cases approached § 101 analysis. After Alice, everyone had to articulate a substantive “inventive concept.” The
U.S. Patent Office adopted new patent examination guidelines in response to
Alice.216 The district courts and Federal Circuit began to place the Mayo
framework front and center in their analysis.217 The Court’s decisions in eBay
and Bilski significantly reduced the number of business method patents,218 but
Alice cast doubt on a whole host of software-related inventions, even though
the Court did not directly address software patents.219 Following Alice, software-related inventions have suffered high rates of mortality in both the U.S.
Patent Office and the courts.220
214

Id. at 223–24.
See id. at 224–26.
216 See 2014 Interim Guidance on Patent Subject Matter Eligibility, 79 Fed. Reg. 74618
(Dec. 16, 2014) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1); see also U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.,
PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION INSTRUCTIONS IN VIEW OF THE SUPREME COURT DECISION IN
ALICE CORPORATION PTY. LTD. V. CLS BANK INTERNATIONAL, ET AL. (2014). .
217 See generally, Mark A. Perry & Jaysen S. Chung, Alice at Six: Patent Eligibility Comes
of Age, 20 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. L. 64, 71–86 (2021).
218 See Mark A. Lemley et al., Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1315 (2010); Peter S.
Menell, Forty Years of Wondering in the Wilderness and No Closer to the Promised Land:
Bilski’s Superficial Textualism and the Missed Opportunity to Return Patent Law to Its
Technological Mooring, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1289 (2011).
219 See David O. Taylor, Confusing Patent Eligibility, 84 TENN. L. REV. 157, 184 (2016);
Ongjen Zivojnovic, Patentable Subject Matter After Alice—Distinguishing Narrow Software Patents from Overly Broad Business Methods, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 807, 808
(2015); Mark A. Lemley & Samantha Zyontz, Does Alice Target Patent Trolls?, 18 J.
EMPIRICAL STUD. 47, 67 (2021) (concluding that 90% of post-Alice decisions on patent eligibility come from the software/information technology industry).
220 See Jasper L. Tran, Software Patents: A One Year Review of Alice v. CLS Bank, 97 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 532, 540 (2015); Daniel Taylor, Down the Rabbit Hole:
Who Will Stand Up for Software Patents After Alice?, 68 ME. L. REV. 217, 222 (2016)
(“Within the first ten months after the Alice decision, U.S. courts had invalidated 3,026
claims in 117 U.S. patents in pretrial motions. By comparison, this represents more patents
than those same courts had invalidated in the previous five years.” (footnote omitted)). But
215
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E. Star Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002 (2017)
Varsity Brands designs, manufactures, and sells cheerleading uniforms that
are decorated using arrangements of chevrons, lines, curves, stripes, and colorful shapes.221 Varsity obtained over 200 copyright registrations for its uniform
decorations.222 Star Athletica also sells cheerleading uniforms.223 Varsity sued
Star Athletica for allegedly infringing the copyrights in five of Varsity’s designs.224
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Star Athletica,
ruling that Varsity’s designs were not copyrightable under 17 U.S.C. § 101225
because they served the utilitarian function of identifying the uniforms as
cheerleading uniforms, and therefore, the designs could not be physically or
conceptually separated from the uniform as a useful article.226 The Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, ruling that Varsity’s designs were copyrightable under 17 U.S.C. § 101 because the designs were capable of existing
independently, as they could be incorporated onto the surface of different mediums of expression.227 The Supreme Court granted certiorari “to resolve widespread disagreement over the proper test” for implementing the Copyright
Act’s separate-identification and independent-existence requirements for the
copyrightability of works of authorship incorporated into the design of a useful
article.228
Justice Thomas’s opinion of the Court began by noting that Congress does
not provide copyright protection for industrial designs.229 However, he explained that the Copyright Act established a special rule for copyrighting works
of authorship incorporated into a useful article.230 A useful article is one that
has “an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance

see ANDREW A. TOOLE & NICHOLAS A. PAIROLERO, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.,
ADJUSTING TO ALICE: USPTO OUTCOMES AFTER ALICE CORP. V. CLS BANK 1 (2020) (noting
that once the USPTO issued revised guidelines on patent eligibility in 2019, the chances of
Section 101 rejections decreased by 25%).
221 Star Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1007 (2017).
222 Id.
223 Id.
224 Id.
225 Under 17 U.S.C. § 101, “the design of a useful article, as defined in this section, shall be
considered a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that, such
design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately
from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.”
226 Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1007–08.
227 Id. at 1008.
228 Id. at 1007.
229 Id.
230 Id.
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of the article or to convey information.”231 Copyright does not protect useful
articles as such but does protect designs “if, and only to the extent that, such
design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.”232 The central inquiry is separability—whether a design feature can be identified and exist independently from a useful article.233
Justice Thomas observed that the Court’s ruling on this issue was solely a matter of statutory interpretation, not a “free-ranging search for the best copyright
policy.”234
Justice Thomas first addressed whether the Court needed to apply a separability analysis in this case.235 Varsity argued that a separability analysis is
necessary only when a work is the design of a useful article, not when a work
appears on a useful article. Under this theory, a design placed on the surface of
a useful article, such as a chevron on a cheerleading uniform, is inherently separable. Justice Thomas stated that Varsity’s argument was inconsistent with the
text of § 101 of the Copyright Act.236 He reasoned that the plain text requires a
separability analysis for any pictorial, graphic, or sculptural feature incorporated into the design of a useful article.237
Justice Thomas outlined how to assess separate identification and independent existence:
We hold that a feature incorporated into the design of a useful article is eligible
for copyright protection only if the feature (1) can be perceived as a two- or
three-dimensional work of art separate from the useful article and (2) would
qualify as a protectable pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work—either on its own
or fixed in some other tangible medium of expression—if it were imagined separately from the useful article into which it is incorporated.238

Justice Thomas noted that identifying a separate feature of a useful article
is normally not onerous.239 The decisionmaker need only ascertain elements
that appear to have pictorial, graphic, or sculptural qualities. The independentexistence requirement, however, is often more difficult to ascertain. To assess
independent existence, “the decisionmaker must determine that the separately

231

17 U.S.C. § 101 (“A ‘useful article’ is an article having an intrinsic utilitarian function
that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information. An article that is normally a part of a useful article is considered a ‘useful article.’ ”).
232 Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1008 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101).
233 Id.
234 Id. at 1010. This observation appears to be a response to Justice Breyer’s extensive discussion of copyright policy in his dissent.
235 Id. at 1009.
236 Id.
237 Id.
238 Id. at 1007.
239 Id. at 1010.
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identified feature has the capacity to exist apart from the utilitarian aspects of
the article.”240
After describing this framework, Justice Thomas evaluated the copyrightability of Varsity’s designs in suit. He first identified the decorations on the surface of the uniforms as features having pictorial and graphic qualities.241 Then,
he noted that the arrangements of colors, shapes, stripes, and chevrons could be
separated and applied to a separate medium such as a painter’s canvas.242 Indeed, Varsity had applied the decorations to other types of clothing without
replicating the cheerleading uniform. He concluded, “The decorations are
therefore separable from the uniforms and eligible for copyright protection.”243
Justice Thomas stated several important caveats to the Court’s ruling. First,
the Court was expressing no opinion about whether Varsity’s decorations were
sufficiently original for copyright protection or whether other prerequisites of a
valid copyright had been satisfied.244 Second, the Court’s ruling did not give
Varsity the right to prohibit anyone from manufacturing a cheerleading uniform
of identical shape, cut, and dimension to the ones on which the decorations in
suit appeared.245
Justice Ginsburg filed a short opinion concurring only in the Court’s judgment. She would not have taken up the separability analysis because Varsity’s
designs were themselves copyrightable.246 To emphasize her point, she attached five of Varsity’s copyright registrations.247 Justice Breyer filed a dissent
joined by Justice Kennedy. Although he agreed “with much in the Court’s
opinion,” he did not agree that Varsity’s designs were eligible for copyright
protection even applying the majority’s separability test.248
The Significance of Star Athletica
At one level, the Star Athletica case is quite important for several reasons.
First, the Supreme Court does not decide many copyright cases, so each decision is carefully studied for its potential impact on future copyright cases. Second, the case came to the Court amidst a robust debate in the United States
about potential statutory protection for fashion design. This debate is reflected
in Justice Breyer’s dissent and his concern that the Court not inadvertently enact fashion legislation through the back door of statutory construction.249 In240

Id.
Id. at 1012.
242 Id.
243 Id.
244 Id. at 1012 n.1.
245 Id. at 1013.
246 Id. at 1018 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
247 Id. at 1018–30.
248 Id. at 1030 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
249 See id. at 1031 (Breyer, J., dissenting). See generally Christopher Buccafusco & Jeanne
Frommer, Fashion’s Function in Intellectual Property Law, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 51
241
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deed, Justice Breyer and Justice Thomas strongly agree on one thing in Star
Athletica: that Congress can best assess the costs and benefits of drawing copyright’s statutory lines.250
At another level, however, the Star Athletica case is of limited importance
for copyright law and practice. The ruling reflects the fact that copyrights are
easy to get, requiring very little originality. However, the most important question in copyright is not whether you can get a copyright but the extent to which
a copyright holder has the power to exclude others from copying, distributing,
and creating derivative works.251 The copyright in certain works provides
strong power to exclude, such as highly original works of art or literary works,
but for many works, the ability to exclude is quite limited. In general, the more
functional or the less original a work is, the weaker the copyright holder’s ability to exclude because of a variety of limiting doctrines in copyright law. The
copyright holder cannot prevent anyone from using ideas,252 works where an
idea and the expression have essentially merged,253 works where there are a
limited number of ways to express an idea,254 works where the expression is
constrained by its function,255 works that are standard treatments,256 or works in
the public domain.257 A copyright holder in a compilation, for example, can only exclude works that are virtually identical to the compilation.258
To bring this back to the facts of the Star Athletica case, Justice Thomas
emphasized that the Court’s ruling did not give Varsity the right to prohibit anyone from manufacturing a cheerleading uniform of identical shape, cut, and
dimension to the ones on which the decorations in suit appeared. Can Star Athletica copy the Varsity designs verbatim? No, that it cannot do. But can Varsity
prevent Star Athletica from using chevrons, lines, curves, stripes, and colorful
shapes to decorate its uniforms? No, Varsity’s copyright is only in a certain
combination of elements. Can Star Athletica use combinations that resemble
Varsity’s uniforms? Most likely, yes, because many resemblances will be related to uncopyrightable ideas, designs where an idea and the expression have essentially merged, designs where there are a limited number of ways to express

(2017); Christopher Buccafusco & Jeanne Frommer, Forgetting Functionality, 166 U. PA. L.
REV. (2017).
250 Id. at 1034.
251 See generally Margot E. Kaminski & Guy A. Rub, Copyright’s Framing Problem, 64
UCLA L. REV. 1102 (2017); Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Scope, 57 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 2197 (2016).
252 Comput. Assoc. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 703 (2d Cir. 1992).
253 Id. at 707–08.
254 Id. at 708.
255 Id. at 714.
256 See Frybarger v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 812 F.2d 525, 530 (9th Cir. 1987).
257 Comput. Assoc. Int’l, Inc., 982 F.2d at 714.
258 See Apple Comput., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1442 (9th Cir. 1994).
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an idea, designs where the expression is constrained by its function, designs
that are stock treatments, or designs that are in the public domain.259
F. TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514
(2017)
In the TC Heartland case, the Supreme Court decided the proper venue for
patent infringement cases brought against a domestic corporation. The Federal
Circuit had ruled that the general federal venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391, applied to patent infringement cases, thus allowing venue in any judicial district
in which the defendant was subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction.260 Justice Thomas’s opinion of the Court disagreed, ruling that the patent venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b), applied instead.261 The text of § 1400(b) limits venue
to any judicial district where the defendant resides or has a regular and established place of business. According to the Court, “resides” means the state of
incorporation.262
The Significance of TC Heartland
The Federal Circuit’s liberal view of venue gave patent plaintiffs (including NPEs) great latitude in choosing their venue. Over time, certain judicial
districts became known as particularly patentee-friendly venues, especially the
Eastern District of Texas.263 Indeed, patent infringement litigation became a
cottage industry there. Justice Scalia once referred to the Eastern District of
Texas as a “renegade” court.264 Justice Thomas’s opinion had the practical effect of preventing the Eastern District of Texas from continuing to serve as the
go-to district for patent litigation. And, consequently, Justice Thomas’s opinion
leveled the playing field in patent litigation, reducing the threat of infringement
just as he had in eBay.265

259

See generally Robert C. Denicola, Imagining Things: Copyright for Useful Articles After
Star Athletica v. Varsity Brands, 79 U. PITT. L. REV. 635 (2018); Lili Levi, The New Separability, 20 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. 709 (2018); David E. Shipley, All for Copyright Stand Up
and Holler! Three Cheers for Star Athletica and the U.S. Supreme Court’s Perceived and
Imagined Separability Test, 35 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 149 (2018); Tyler Ochoa, What
Is a “Useful Article” in Copyright Law After Star Athletica?, 166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 105
(2017); Jane C. Ginsburg, The Sum Is More Public Domain than Its Parts: U.S. Copyright
Protection for Works of Applied Art under Star Athletica’s Imagination Test, 166 U. PA. L.
REV. 83 (2017).
260 TC Heartland v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1517–18 (2017).
261 Id. at 1520.
262 Id. at 1520–21.
263 See Robert G. Bone, Forum Shopping and Patent Law—a Comment on TC Heartland, 96
TEX. L. REV. 141, 147 (2017).
264 See J. Jonas Anderson, Reining in a “Renegade Court”: TC Heartland and the Eastern
District of Texas, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1569, 1571, 1576 (2018).
265 Id. at 1607–08.
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G. Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC, 138 S.
Ct. 1365 (2018)
The Oil States case considered the constitutionality of a procedure to challenge issued patents, called inter partes review, that Congress created in the
America Invents Act.266 Under this procedure, anyone can request cancellation
of a patent on the grounds that, based on prior art, it fails the non-obviousness
or novel standards for patentability.267 Before review is instituted, however, the
director of the Patent Office must determine that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner will prevail with respect to at least one of the patent
claims challenged.268 Once the director institutes inter partes review, a threemember panel of administrative law judges from the Patent Trial and Appeal
Board examines the patent’s validity.269 Once the panel’s decision becomes final, any party dissatisfied with the panel’s decision can appeal to the Federal
Circuit.270
Does the inter partes procedure violate Article III or the Seventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution? Article III vests judicial power “in one supreme
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”271 By implication, Congress cannot vest judicial power in
entities outside of Article III courts. In determining whether a proceeding involves the exercise of Article III judicial power, the Supreme Court has differentiated between public and private rights.272 Congress has “significant latitude
to assign adjudication of public rights to [non-Article III adjudicators].”273
Justice Thomas’s opinion of the Court concluded that the government’s
grant of a patent right is a government-granted public franchise.274 Inter partes
review is simply the government’s reconsideration of its grant of this public
franchise.275 Thus, Congress can grant the Patent Office the right to reconsider
the grant of a patent without violating Article III. Furthermore, “when Congress properly assigns a matter to adjudication in a non-Article III tribunal, ‘the
Seventh Amendment poses no independent bar to the adjudication of that action by a nonjury factfinder.’ ”276 Thus, Justice Thomas’s resolution of the Article III issue also resolved the Seventh Amendment challenge.

266

Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 299–319.
Id. § 311(b).
268 Id. § 314(a).
269 Id. § 316(c).
270 Id. § 319.
271 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
272 Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1373
(2018) (citing Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 573 U.S. 25, 32 (2014)).
273 Id.
274 Id. at 1369, 1373.
275 Id. at 1373.
276 Id. at 1379 (quoting Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 53–54 (1989)).
267
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Justice Thomas’s opinion emphasized the narrowness of the Court’s holding.277 The Court was not deciding whether patent infringement actions could
be heard by non-Article III courts or whether review would be constitutional
“without any sort of intervention by a court at any stage of the proceedings.”278
The Court also was not suggesting that patents are not property for purposes of
the Due Process Clause or the Takings Clause.279
Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor joined Justice Thomas’s opinion
of the Court in full but filed a short concurrence to say that the Court’s opinion
should not be read to say private rights may never by adjudicated by Article III
courts.280 Justice Gorsuch wrote a dissent joined by Chief Justice Roberts based
largely on the historical record of Article III at the time it was written by the
Founders.281 His dissent reviewed English legal history, including several English cases and the scholarly literature discussing them.282 He argued that in
England, around the time of the founding of the United States, only courts of
law could hear patent challenges. He pointed out that the trajectory of English
legal history demonstrated an important policy point—that courts acted as an
important restraint on the executive’s privilege to grant patents, which had been
misused at times by the kings and queens of England.283 However, Justice
Thomas’s opinion of the Court reviewed the same historical record and came to
a different conclusion about its implications.284
The Significance of Oil States
In the years leading up to enactment of the America Invents Act, patent
scholars expressed concern that the Patent Office was chilling innovation by
issuing too may low-quality patents.285 The resource-constrained Patent Office
could not keep up with the large volume of patent applications in the information economy and found it difficult to access and assess prior art in emerging technological fields. Once a low-quality patent was issued, it cost hundreds
of thousands of dollars to litigate its validity in the federal courts.286 Congress
277

Id.
Id. (quoting Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Rev. Comm’n, 430
U.S. 442, 455 n.13 (1977)) (noting that inter partes review decisions by the U.S. Patent Office are appealable to the Federal Circuit).
279 Id.
280 Id. at 1379–80.
281 Id. at 1380.
282 Id. at 1381–83, 1385.
283 Id. at 1381–82.
284 Id. at 1376–78.
285 See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577,
591 (1999).
286 See Christopher J. Walker, Constitutional Tensions in Agency Adjudication, 104 IOWA L.
REV. 2679, 2700 (2019); Matthew G. Sipe, Experts, Generalists, Laypeoople—and the Federal Circuit, 32 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 575, 582 (2019).
278
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created the inter partes review procedure as a more economical way to challenge patent validity. By upholding inter partes review, the Supreme Court allowed Congress to adjust innovation policy at a point in history where patents
seemed to be threatening rather than incentivizing innovation.
H. WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 138 S. Ct. 2129 (2018)
Normally, U.S. patent holders can only sue for infringements that occur in
the United States. However, under § 271(f)(2) of the Patent Act, a U.S. patent
holder can also sue for infringement if someone ships components of a patented
invention abroad to be assembled there.287 If the patent is valid and infringed,
the patent holder can recover damages adequate to compensate for the infringement.288
WesternGeco developed and patented technology for surveying the ocean
floor. This technology is used primarily by oil and gas companies.289 When
ION Geophysical began selling a competing system, WesternGeco sued for patent infringement and won.290 The jury awarded WesternGeco royalties and lost
profits for contracts that WesternGeco lost to ION.291 ION argued that the Patent Act does not apply extraterritorially, so WesternGeco could not recover
lost profits based on any lost foreign survey contracts. The district court rejected ION’s argument, but on appeal the Federal Circuit agreed with ION.292
Justice Thomas’s opinion of the Court reversed the Federal Circuit. While
acknowledging that the presumption against extraterritoriality has deep roots,
the Court developed a two-step framework for deciding when that presumption
could be rebutted.293 The key issue was identifying the “focus” of the statute,
which, in the case of § 271(f)(2), was the exporting of components from the
United States.294 As such, according to Justice Thomas, WesternGeco’s damages were related to that domestic act (exporting) and therefore amounted to a
domestic application of the Patent Act’s damages provision, § 284.295 Justice
Gorsuch filed a dissent joined by Justice Breyer, disagreeing with Justice
Thomas’s interpretation and application of the Patent Act.

287

35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(2).
35 U.S.C. § 284 authorizes “damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but
in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer . . . .”
289 WesternGeco LLC v. Ion Geophysical Corp., 138 S. Ct. 2129, 2135 (2018).
290 Id.
291 Id.
292 Western Geco LLC v. Ion Geophysical Corp., 791 F.3d 1340, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
293 WesternGeco, 138 S. Ct. at 2136.
294 Id. at 2136–37.
295 Id. at 2139.
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The Significance of WesternGeco
WesternGeco is a remedies case, which brings us full circle back to eBay,
Justice Thomas’s first intellectual property opinion for the Roberts Court.
However, the surprise in WesternGeco is that the Court reversed the Federal
Circuit to strengthen patents remedies, rather than weaken them as it had in
eBay. More broadly, WesternGeco is one of only a handful of cases during the
Roberts Court that can be characterized as pro-patent. As mentioned, Justices
from both the liberal and conservative sides of the Court have overwhelmingly
and often unanimously dialed back the rights of patent holders during the Roberts Court.
Does WesternGeco signal a shift in the Court toward a pro-patent holder
perspective, especially coming on the heels of Star Atheltica, which some
commentators characterize as pro-copyright holder?296 I think not. WesternGeco, instead, is best read as an example of Justice Thomas faithfully construing the patent statute, earnestly attempting to ascertain congressional intent
with no particular policy agenda, knowing that Congress can pass correcting
legislation if the Court gets the interpretation wrong or has identified an unintended ambiguity in the statute.297
IV. FEATURES OF JUSTICE THOMAS’S INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
JURISPRUDENCE
This Part summarizes the distinctive features of Justice Thomas’s intellectual property law opinions: namely, unanimity; use of history in the context of
applying textualism; preference for flexible tests; aptitude for understanding
technology and business context; sensitivity to the role played by intellectual
property law practitioners; and appreciation for the role of remedies.
A. Unanimity
Although in many types of cases it can be difficult for Justice Thomas to
find common ground with other members of the Court,298 that has not proven to
296

See generally Sam H. Boyer, From Deepsouth to Westerngeco: The Patent Provision
Heard Around the World, 80 LA. L. REV. 165, 188–89 (2019); Timothy R. Holbrook, Extraterritoriality and Proximate Cause After Westerngeco, 21 YALE J.L. & TECH. 189, 224
(2019); Amy L. Landers, Proximate Cause and Patent Law, 25 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 329,
329 (2019); Andrew C. Michaels, Implicit Overruling and Foreign Lost Profits, 25 B.U. J.
SCI. & TECH. L. 408, 409 (2019).
297 This aligns with the Court’s approach in Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 427,
442 (2007), and Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 528 (1972).
298 Some commentators argue that Chief Justice Rehnquist assigned fewer majority opinions
to Justice Thomas in important constitutional cases because Thomas’s views made it difficult for him to persuade a majority of Justices to join his opinions. See TUSHNET, supra note
60, at 85–86; JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME
COURT 119 (2007). Mark Tushnet notes, however, that Justice Thomas’s skill in handling
important and difficult cases involving statutory interpretation and economic regulation may
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be so in intellectual property cases. His intellectual property majority opinions
are unanimous or nearly so.299 Over time, as the papers of retired Supreme
Court Justices become public, we may better understand the reasons for this
unanimity, but for now, we can explore several possibilities.300
One straightforward explanation could be that Justice Thomas wrote the
majority opinions only in clear-cut, noncontroversial cases.301 While that may
be true in certain instances, this explanation does not resonate for challenging
cases such as Alice302 and Myriad on patent eligibility,303 Star Athletica on
copyrightability,304 Oil States on inter partes patent review,305 or WesternGeco
on the extraterritorial application of patent law.306

have also limited the assignment of constitutional questions to him during the Rehnquist
Court. TUSHNET, supra note 60, at 86.
299 eBay Inc. v. Mercexchange LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 389 (2006) (unanimous); Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 620 (2008) (unanimous); Alice Corp. v. CLS
Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 208 (2014) (unanimous); TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp.
Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1516 (2017) (unanimous); Helsinn Healthcare v. Teva Pharm.,
139 S. Ct. 628, 630 (2019) (unanimous); Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1664, 1668
(2017) (unanimous); Kappos v. Hyatt, 566 U.S. 431, 432 (2012) (unanimous); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2110 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in part); Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237, 1240 (2010) (Ginsburg, J.,
Breyer, J., and Sotomayor, J., concurring in part); Star Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands,
Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1006 (2017) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment and Breyer, J. and
Kennedy, J., dissenting); Oil States Energy Servs. v. Green’s Energy Grp. LLC, 138 S. Ct.
1365, 1368 (2018) (Roberts, C.J. and Gorsuch, J., dissenting); WesternGeco LLC v. Ion Geophysical Corp., 138 S. Ct. 2129, 2134 (2018) (Breyer, J. and Gorsuch, J., dissenting). Given
the assumption that Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas always voted in tandem, it is ironic
that in Myriad, Justice Scalia cheekily concurred only in part, simply because he did not appreciate the way Justice Thomas’s opinion of the Court dove into the details of the technology. Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2120.
300 See Seaman & Wang, supra note 54, at 917 (using the papers of Justice Lewis Powell to
better understand patent law decisions during the Burger Court).
301 See Eastman, supra note 54, at 702 (disputing the notion that Justice Thomas gets assigned only the easy or boring cases). Justice Thomas’s opinion of the Court in Sandoz Inc.
v. Amgen Inc. provides a good example of Justice Thomas construing a complex statute (the
Biologics Price Competition Act of 2009) and dealing with complex technology (filgrastim).
Sandoz, 137 S. Ct. 1664.
302 Alice was not a straight-forward case—the number of concurring and dissenting opinions
in the Federal Circuit was truly remarkable. See Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 214–15 (summarizing the Federal Circuit opinions).
303 By comparison, Justice Kennedy’s opinion of the Court on patent eligibility in Bilski v.
Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010), was not unanimous.
304 By comparison, Justice Roberts’s opinion of the Court on copyrightability in Georgia v.
Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1498, 1503 (2020), only attracted a five Justice majority.
305 By comparison, Justice Gorsuch’s opinion of the Court on inter partes review in SAS
Institute, Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1352 (2018), only attracted a five Justice majority.
306 By comparison, the Court’s opinions in Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437,
440 (2007), are more fractured in a case where Justice Ginsburg wrote the opinion of the
Court.
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Another explanation could be that, given his prior experience, Justice
Thomas is especially skillful at deciding intellectual property cases. As such,
he may be particularly persuasive when the Justices discuss intellectual property cases in choosing or deciding them.307 In intellectual property cases, it is not
a given that a Justice from a certain ideological wing of the Court can convince
his or her colleagues to join the opinion of the Court.308 Although the Justices
do not decide cases in a wide-open interactive fashion, their views can be
shaped, molded, and sometimes changed as the discussion moves from colleague to colleague.309 And once the Court’s opinion gets assigned, Justice
Thomas may be particularly adept in the way he handles the decisional details
that get fleshed out during the opinion-writing process310 and good at incorporating the views expressed by the other Justices during the conference, thus
maintaining a unanimous conference vote or picking up votes during the opinion writing process.311
Another reason could be that Justice Thomas crafts his intellectual property
opinions in a way that stays close to facts of the case. As discussed later in this
Article this style has several important advantages in intellectual property cases. But on top of those advantages, narrow opinions are more likely to receive
greater support from colleagues. Indeed, this brand of incremental decisionmaking is a signature of the Roberts Court.312
Finally, Justice Thomas may be particularly adept at consensus building in
intellectual property cases. For example, the level of consensus in Alice stands
in contrast to Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court in Bilski, a case that resembled Alice in that the patents in suit were focused on intermediated settlement business methods. In Bilski, Justice Stevens wrote a lengthy opinion
joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor concurring only in the

307

John Eastman predicts that once more papers of Justices from the Rehnquist Court become public, it will be revealed that Justice Thomas was particularly good at maintaining
votes or even picking up votes during the opinion writing process. See Eastman, supra note
54, at 702. Some commentators argue that, contrary to the conventional wisdom that Justice
Scalia persuaded Justice Thomas to join his opinions, it may be fairly said that Justice Scalia
actually followed Justice Thomas on many critical issues. See JAN CRAWFORD GREENBURG,
SUPREME CONFLICT: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT 117, 124–25 (2007).
308 See, e.g., Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1489, 1503 (2020) (opinion of
the Court by Chief Justice Roberts, with Justices Thomas and Alito dissenting, along with
Justices Breyer and Ginsburg); Return Mail, Inc. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 139 S. Ct. 1853, 1858
(2019) (opinion of the Court by Justice Sotomayor, with Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Kagan dissenting); MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 119 (2007) (opinion of
the Court by Justice Scalia, with Justice Thomas dissenting).
309 REHNQUIST, supra note 52, at 293–95.
310 Id. at 295.
311 See Seaman & Wang, supra note 54, at 922–23 (describing vote changes in key patent
cases during the Burger Court).
312 See BISKUPIC, supra note 31, at 176–77.
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Court’s judgment.313 In his Bilski concurrence, Justice Stevens argued categorically against the patentability of business methods.314 He also criticized Justice
Kennedy’s analysis of when an abstract idea may be patent ineligible, writing
that Justice Kennedy “never provides a satisfying account of what constitutes
an unpatentable abstract idea” and that Justice Kennedy’s “mode of analysis (or
lack thereof) may have led to the correct outcome in this case, but it also means
that the Court’s musings on this issue stand for very little.”315
Perhaps Justice Thomas’s addition of the framework from Mayo in his Alice opinion satisfied Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor because they
fully joined Justice Thomas’s opinion of the Court. Justice Sotomayor, joined
by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, filed a short concurring opinion in Alice
simply to re-state their view that business methods never qualify as a patent eligible process under § 101.316 Justice Kagan, who had replaced Justice Stevens
when he retired, simply joined Justice Thomas’s opinion.
In Star Athletica, Justice Thomas’s opinion of the Court was not unanimous, but five other Justices joined the opinion in full, including Justice Kagan
and Justice Sotomayor.317 Justice Thomas’s opinion attracted more support
than the opinions of either of the copyright experts on the Court—Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer. No other Justice joined Justice Ginsburg’s opinion
concurring in the judgment.318 Only Justice Kennedy joined Justice Breyer’s
dissent, which, notably, agreed with much of Justice Thomas’s opinion of the
Court, just not its final disposition of the case.319
B. History and Textualism
Justice Thomas’s opinions show an appreciation for drawing lessons from
historical practice.320 Central to the decision in eBay, for example, was an understanding of the traditional four-factor test used by trial courts in deciding
whether to grant injunctive relief.321 Justice Thomas’s opinion in Quanta shows
that history is important for contextualizing how the doctrine of patent exhaustion limits the patent rights that survive the initial authorized sale of a patented

313

Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 613 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. at 614.
315 Id. at 621.
316 Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 227 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
317 See Star Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002 (2017).
318 See id. at 1018 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
319 Id. at 1030 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
320 See, e.g., Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharms., 139 S. Ct. 628, 633–34 (2019); Kappos v. Hyatt, 132 S. Ct. 1690 (2012); see also Adam Mossoff, Exclusion and Exclusive Use
in Patent Law, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 321, 324 (2009) (highlighting how in repeatedly reversing the Federal Circuit, the Supreme Court has expressed fealty to historical patent doctrines).
321 See eBay Inc. v. Mercexchange LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 392–93 (2006).
314
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item.322 In Myriad, Justice Thomas followed the Court’s historical practice of
employing a longstanding Court-created exception to 35 U.S.C. § 101 on patentable subject matter.323 And in TC Heartland, Justice Thomas used the historical development of the patent statute, Supreme Court precedents construing
the statute, and the interplay between the two as aids to construe the text of the
statute.324
This appreciation of historical practice is not originalism,325 of course, because the Court is not interpreting the U.S. Constitution, but, like originalism,
Justice Thomas looks to history for precedent. For him, historical practice provides something like a default rule or at least a place to start. However, historical practice is not the final word when Congress has passed a statute—the text
of the statute, rather than history, provides the relevant authority.326 In other
words, textualism, rather than originalism, is the relevant tool of judicial decision-making in most of Justice Thomas’s intellectual property opinions.327
For example, Justice Thomas’s opinion in Star Athletica involving § 101 of
the Copyright Act is a straightforward exercise in textualism,328 although Justice Thomas used history to shed light on the origins of modern copyright

322

See Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 625–28 (2008).
See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 589–90
(2013).
324 See TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1517–21
(2017).
325 See MAGNET, supra note 7, at 61–108 (describing Justice Thomas’s originalism in action). See generally Randy E. Barnett & Evan D. Bernick, No Arbitrary Power: An Originalist Theory of the Due Process of Law, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1599 (2019); Randy E. Barnett & Evan D. Bernick, The Letter and the Spirit: A Unified Theory of Originalism, 107
GEO. L.J. 1 (2018); Kevin C. Walsh, Originalist Law Reform, Judicial Departmentalism,
and Justice Scalia, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 2311 (2017); Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism Versus
Living Constitutionalism: The Conceptual Structure of the Great Debate, 113 NW. U. L.
REV. 1243 (2019); Lawrence B. Solum, Originalist Methodology, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 269
(2017).
326 In contrast, the Court relied only on historical practice in Impression Products because
Congress has not codified the patent exhaustion doctrine in the Patent Act. Lexmark Int’l,
Inc. v. Impression Prods., Inc., 816 F.3d 721, 731 (Fed. Cir. 2016), rev’d and remanded, 137
S. Ct. 1523 (2017).
327 The word “textualism” was first used by Mark Pattison in 1863 to criticize Puritan theology. Textualism, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://oed.com [https://perma.cc/YE3DVPQM]. The term “textualism” first appeared in a Supreme Court opinion when Justice
Robert Jackson used it in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 640
(1952). See generally ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012); ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES
(2014); Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118
(2016). The Court’s recent decision in Bostock shows the Court’s various approaches to applying textualism. Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1754 (2020). See also Scott A.
Moss, Judges’ Varied Views of Textualism, 88 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (2017).
328 See generally John F. Manning, Second-Generation Textualism, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1287
(2010) (identifying Justice Thomas as a committed textualist); Judge H. Brent McKnight,
The Emerging Contours of Justice Thomas’s Textualism, 12 REGENT U. L. REV. 365 (2000).
323
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law.329 He specifically rejected the suggestion inherent in Justice Breyer’s dissent that the Court should be searching for the best copyright policy.330 According to Justice Thomas, if the Court misconstrues a copyright statute or if its
construction reveals an unintended or unwanted consequence, then Congress
can act accordingly to adjust copyright law.331
However, in Myriad, Justice Thomas departed from textualism. Indeed, his
opinion in Myriad departs from the plain language of both the Patent Act and
the U.S. Constitution. The text of 35 U.S.C. § 101 would, on its face, allow a
patent on any new and useful composition of matter. In addition, Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution (often called the “IP Clause”) empowers Congress “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries.”332 Yet, in the face of this plain language,
Justice Thomas invalidated Myriad’s composition of matter patent claims because they were merely discoveries of a composition of matter found in nature.333
Although this departure is noteworthy given Justice Thomas’s respect for
textualism, it is not surprising for those familiar with patent law. Indeed, Justice Thomas’s treatment of Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 is consistent with his
respect for originalism. The Supreme Court previously construed the original
public meaning of the term “discoveries” in the Constitution’s IP Clause. In its
original context, discoveries meant something akin to what we call inventions
in modern nomenclature—i.e., inventing something new, rather than merely
finding something that already exists in nature.334 Thus, Justice Thomas’s
originalism proved to be a comfortable fit for the Myriad case.
Originalism may help explain Justice Thomas’s departure from the plain
words of the Constitution’s IP Clause in Myriad, but what explains his departure from the plain text of the Patent Act? An obvious explanation is respect for
stare decisis.335 Another explanation relates to originalism. The Court’s long329

Star Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1011 (2017).
Id. at 1010 (“This is not a free-ranging search for the best copyright policy.”).
331 Id. at 1015. This approach is well illustrated in an example from patent law. Deepsouth
Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 528 (1972).
332 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. (emphasis added).
333 See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 590–94
(2013).
334 See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67
(1972); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130–31 (1948). See generally Sean O’Connor, The Overlooked French Influence on the Intellectual Property
Clause, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 733 (2015); Giles S. Rich, Principles of Patentability, 28 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 393 (1960).
335 See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 602 (2010) (noting that the three historical exceptions to patentability trace back to Le Roy v. Tatham, 14 How. 156, 174–75 (1853)). Often,
however, Justice Thomas gives less deference to stare decisis than other members of the
Court. See Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1007–08 (2020) (Thomas, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment).
330
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standing exception to 35 U.S.C. § 101 reflects the intent of the Founders to, on
the one hand, provide incentives for invention using exclusive rights, but, on
the other hand, leave ample room for innovation by limiting those exclusive
rights.
Interestingly, the Oil States case pits two fervent originalists against one
another: Justice Thomas and Justice Gorsuch.336 Both Justices Thomas and
Gorsuch agreed that the Patent Clause of the Constitution was written against
the backdrop of the English system. But Justice Thomas’s opinion identifies
two reasons for diverging from Justice Gorsuch’s dissent337 based on the historical record.
First, Justice Thomas’s reading of English legal history led to the conclusion that, in addition to proceedings in a court of law, a patent could be cancelled by a proceeding in the Privy Council.338 This proceeding by the executive branch of English government resembled executive branch action in inter
partes review. Second, he argued that historical practice was not decisive because adjudications covered by the public rights doctrine from their very nature
could, as Congress chose, be delegated to executive officers or judicial tribunals.339 As Justice Thomas put it, “That Congress chose the courts in the past
does not foreclose its choice of the PTO today.”340
However, Justice Thomas’s opinion in Myriad reveals that certain historical practices do not always prove decisive. Myriad had argued that the Patent
Office’s past practice of awarding gene patents was entitled to deference and
336

See generally NEIL GORSUCH, A REPUBLIC, IF YOU CAN KEEP IT (2019) (describing Justice Gorsuch’s views on originalism); Kyle Peterson, The High Court’s Rocky Mountain
Originalist, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 6, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-high-courtsrocky-mountain-originalist-11567792378 [https://perma.cc/N5NY-WDQG].
337 Justice Gorsuch criticized Justice Thomas’s judicial restraint in Oil States as the judiciary ceding important constitutional ground to the political branches. Oil States Energy
Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1381–86 (2018) (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting). Justice Gorsuch also dissented in WesternGeco, although this time joined by
Justice Breyer. WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 138 S. Ct. 2129, 2139 (2018)
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting). However, the disagreement between Justice Thomas and Justice
Gorsuch in WesternGeco was not over the original intent of the U.S. Constitution but over
the proper construction of the Patent Act. Id. Justice Gorsuch agreed with Justice Thomas’s
general analysis that lost profits claims may not always offend the presumption against extraterritorial application of statutes, but Justice Gorsuch disagreed with Justice Thomas’s
analysis in the context of the Patent Act. Id. at 2143.
338 Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1376–79.
339 Id. at 1377.
340
Id. at 1378. Perhaps we are just beginning to see the varieties of originalism on the Roberts Court. Editorial Board, The Court’s Unpolitical Conservatives, WALL ST. J. (Jun. 17,
2019, 7:23 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-courts-unpolitical-conservatives-115608
13838 [https://perma.cc/F2E6-53A8] (“Two rulings [Gamble v. U.S. and Virginia Uranium
v. Warren] show the varieties of originalist legal interpretation.”). And perhaps we are also
just beginning to see the varieties of textualism. Editorial Board, The Supreme Court’s Textualism Test, WALL ST. J., (Nov. 21, 2019, 7:21 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/thesupreme-courts-textualism-test-11574382080 [https://perma.cc/4EH9-9MW8] (discussing
Bostock v. Clayton County).
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cited the Supreme Court’s J.E.M. Ag Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International
case for support.341 However, Justice Thomas noted that in J.E.M. Congress
had recognized and endorsed the Patent Office’s position in subsequent legislation, something that had not happened in the Myriad case.342
C. Preference for Flexible Tests and Frameworks
Justice Thomas’s opinions in patent cases show a preference for flexible
facts and circumstances tests as opposed to bright lines or default rules. Justice
Thomas suggested in eBay that this flexible approach works best when addressing the complex and ever-evolving nature of the parties and interests in the
technology sector.343 In eBay, Justice Thomas criticized the district court for
establishing a principle that a nonpracticing entity could never prove the need
for an injunction or that a willingness to license patents would categorically
rule out injunctive relief.344
Sometimes these tests get articulated as frameworks of analysis. For example, Justice Thomas’s opinion in Alice sets out a framework for analyzing
whether an abstract idea has been transformed into something patentable.345 Interestingly, although he implies that the framework was lifted directly from the
Mayo case, Justice Breyer’s opinion of the Court in Mayo never articulates
such a framework.346 Instead, Justice Thomas synthesized Justice Breyer’s
opinion into a concise two-step analytical framework. As mentioned above,
Justice Thomas likely created the framework in response to Justice Steven’s
criticism in Bilski that the Court had provided no meaningful way to assess the
patentability of abstract ideas. It appears that Justice Thomas brought the Court
together by elevating Justice Breyer’s Mayo decision to the Court’s guiding
framework for patent eligibility.
D. Aptitude for Understanding Technology and the Business Context
To author an effective opinion of the Court in a patent case, a Justice
should have an aptitude for understanding technology. To be sure, some patents

341

Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 577 (2013); see
also J.E.M Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124 (2001).
342 Myriad, 569 U.S. at 577; J.E.M Ag Supply, 534 U.S. at 127. Justice Thomas also wrote
the majority opinion in J.E.M. Ag Supply.
343 eBay Inc. v. Mercexchange LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 393–94 (2006).
344 Id. at 393.
345 Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 217 (2014); see also Star Athletica, LLC v.
Varsity Brands, Inc. 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1012 (2017) (summarizing the two-step analysis for
determining when a useful article is eligible for copyright protection).
346 See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Lab’ys, Inc. 566 U.S. 66 (2012).
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do not cover complicated technology,347 but the patents in Quanta and Myriad
did.348
In Quanta, Justice Thomas needed to understand computer systems, including the functions of and relationship between chipsets, microprocessors,
buses, cache memory, random access memory, and peripheral devices. In particular, he needed to understand the computer system inventions described in
LGE’s three patents in suit and why they were useful inventions. One of the
LGE patents solved an issue that arises when data is stored in both cache and
random access memory; another patent related to the coordination of requests
to read from and write to random access memory; and another patent addressed
the problem of managing data traffic on a computer bus connecting two computer components so that no one device monopolizes the bus.349
Not only did Justice Thomas need a general understanding of computer
systems, but the specific legal issue in the Quanta case also challenged him to
understand the technology deeply because the test for whether a component can
exhaust a patent comes down to whether the component embodies the patented
invention. In other words, does the component contain the essence of the patented invention? In answering “yes” to that question, Justice Thomas had to
appreciate the many aspects of computing that occur in microprocessors and
chipsets and, at the same time, the distinct lack of novelty involved with simply
assembling a computer system by combining microprocessors and chipsets
with standard components.350
Moreover, Justice Thomas needed to understand the eyeglass lens technology from the Univis case because that case was the controlling precedent in
Quanta.351 In particular, he had to differentiate between the inventive and noninventive parts of the lens production process to ascertain when the essence of
the patents in suit were embodied in the lenses. To better understand the lens
technology, Justice Thomas performed a detailed analysis of the patents in suit
in Univis.352 Analogizing this process to the facts in Quanta became complicated because in Univis, the defendant removed something from the component,
and in Quanta, the defendant added something to the component.
Understanding technological innovation (computer systems and eyeglass
lenses), however, was not sufficient to decide the Quanta case. The Quanta
case also required Justice Thomas to understand the sophisticated business ar347

E.g., Return Mail, Inc. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 139 S. Ct. 1853, 1856 (2019) (business
method patent for processing undeliverable mail); Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440
U.S. 257, 259 (1979) (key holder).
348 Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1664 (2017), is another good example of Justice
Thomas dealing with complex technology (filgrastim) in the context of biosimilars.
349 Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 621–23 (2008).
350 Some people call firms like Quanta the “screwdriver guys” because these firm do little
more than screw things together rather than do anything particularly inventive.
351 Quanta, 553 U.S. at 631.
352 Id. at 632–33 (citing United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 250–51 (1942)).
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rangements that technology companies use to bring their products to market.353
These business arrangements are just as important in the information economy
as the development of technology.354 In the early days of the computer business, firms such as IBM would create every component of a computer system
and sell the system directly to customers. Today, the computer business is more
complicated. Some firms still create and sell complete computer systems, but
more often, firms such as Intel focus on creating certain components, and others, such as Quanta, focus on assembling components to build systems. It often
takes a variety of firms to create computer systems and distribute them to the
marketplace through a variety of channels.
LGE and Intel put together a license agreement structure that they believed
would allow them to maximize product distribution, given the diverse array of
partners that would be involved in creating and bringing computer systems to
market. The complexity of these license agreements created challenges, especially about how the license grants would flow downstream. Even with sophisticated lawyers drafting them, ultimately these license agreements did not operate as LGE intended. For example, the boilerplate language in the LGE-Intel
patent cross license providing that it would not alter normal patent exhaustion
hurt LGE’s patent exhaustion argument.355 Also, deciding not to draft Intel’s
sale of Intel products for combination with non-Intel products as a license condition rather than a contractual covenant hurt LGE’s patent exhaustion argument.356
When the Federal Circuit looked at the license agreements, it said “good
enough,” but with a more exacting eye, Justice Thomas concluded “not good
enough.” Justice Thomas required clear and persuasive proof that the historical
practice of patent exhaustion had been altered by a well-drafted, binding contract.357 In doing so, he provided important guidance for lawyers drafting patent
license agreements.
The Myriad case, like the Quanta case, highlights Justice Thomas’s aptitude for understanding complex technology and applying that understanding to
the legal principles at work in the case. Myriad required an understanding of
genetics and the application of genetics to diagnostic medicine. Justice Thomas
seemed to revel in the details of the applicable science, to such a degree that
353

Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharms., Inc., 139 S. Ct. 628 (2019), provides another
good illustration of Justice Thomas’s engagement with technology-related business models.
354 See generally GOMULKIEWICZ ET AL., supra note 165. For example, it will be just as important to figure out how to manufacture and distribute a vaccine for COVID-19 as it will be
to develop the vaccine.
355 Quanta, 553 U.S. at 636.
356 See generally Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Conditions and Covenants in License Contracts: Tales from a Test of the Artistic License, 17 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 335 (2009).
357 In eBay, the question was whether the Patent Act had altered historical practice. eBay
Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 392 (2006). In Quanta, the question was whether
the contracts had altered the historical practice. Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553
U.S. 617, 624 (2008).
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Justice Scalia cheekily refused to concur in the parts of the opinion “going into
fine details of molecular biology.”358 Going beyond the science lesson, Justice
Thomas analyzed Myriad’s patent claims for a purpose: to see if they described
anything inventive or essentially reflected Myriad’s discovery of the BRCA1
and BRACA2 genes. He also distinguished the biological invention from the
Diamond v. Chakrabarty case from the claimed invention in Myriad, showing
how the addition of plasmids to a bacterium in Chakrabarty created a new
composition of matter, while the disaggregated gene sequence created in Myriad did not.359
Like Quanta, the Myriad case highlights Justice Thomas’s appreciation of
the importance of the business aspects of technology. He understood that invalidating Myriad’s patents did not mean that Myriad could not profit from its discoveries. For one thing, Myriad’s discovery allowed it to enjoy a first mover
advantage in genetic testing for breast and ovarian cancers. For another, invalidating Myriad’s patents merely changed the focus of Myriad’s business from
monopolizing testing to providing superior testing products and services. Indeed, Myriad probably benefitted in its marketing from the cachet of its
BRACA discoveries. Moreover, to the extent that Myriad invented a patentable
method related to, or a patentable application of, its BRACA discoveries, Myriad could monetize those inventions as well as its synthetic cDNA invention.360
These insights undoubtedly led Justice Thomas to surmise that the reward Myriad obtained for its discoveries was sufficient to incentivize Myriad (and others
in the gene discovery business) to make further genetic discoveries, even if the
magnitude of the reward was less than Myriad desired.
One potentially puzzling aspect of Justice Thomas’s opinion in Myriad is
his clarification that emphasized that the case involved composition of matter
patent claims but not method claims or claims related to the application of the
discovery of genetic information.361 Is Justice Thomas encouraging the type of
cleverness in drafting patent claims that he sought to avoid in eBay? I think not.
Highlighting this difference relates to business models, not patent drafting. Justice Thomas is suggesting routes to successfully commercialize an invention of
this nature and pathways that will not be successful. In other words, Justice
Thomas is not encouraging manipulative patent drafting but pointing the way
to productive business models.362

358

Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 596 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
359 Id. at 590–91 (majority opinion).
360 See id. at 596.
361 See id. at 595–96.
362 Cf. Kimble v. Marvel Ent., LLC, 576 U.S. 446, 453–54 (2015) (discussing, in a majority
opinion written by Justice Kagan, approaches to patent licensing that avoid patent misuse).
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E. Appreciating the Role of Intellectual Property Law Practice
The Quanta opinion teaches that license agreement drafters must carefully
architect license conditions, so they flow successfully downstream at every step
of the deal flow. However, Quanta’s requirement of rigor in license agreement
drafting may lead some lawyers to the conclusion that it is a better business decision to permit patent exhaustion than to put into place the array of binding
contracts necessary to avoid exhaustion.363 In either situation, Justice Thomas
leaves matters in the hands of skilled intellectual property licensing lawyers
and the business judgment of their clients, perhaps reflecting his experience as
a corporate counsel.364
In addition to its sensitivity to license agreement drafting practices, the
Quanta opinion is savvy about patent prosecution practices. In particular, Justice Thomas understood that a clever patent drafter could too easily swap between method and apparatus claims. The legal rule and the policy that it represents, he noted in Quanta, should not be so easily manipulated.365 In Alice,
Justice Thomas renewed his warning that patent law principles should not depend on the patent drafter’s art. This arose in the context of assessing Alice
Corporation’s patent claims for computer systems and a computer-readable
medium. He noted that the special computer hardware mentioned in the patent
claims was nothing special at all and just amounted to generic computer functions.366
F. Appreciating the Role of Remedies
Justice Thomas’s opinion in eBay shows a keen awareness of how adjusting remedies is often the best legal tool for right-sizing intellectual property
protection.367 Indeed, most scholars focus on the scope and length of protection
and underappreciate the role of remedies.368 In contrast, Justice Thomas’s ap-

363

See Gomulkiewicz, supra note 112, at 220–37; see also FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc. 969
F.3d 974, 994–95 (9th Cir. 2020) (describing sophisticated OEM licensing structure).
364 See generally XUAN-THAO N. NGUYEN ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, INFORMATION,
AND SOFTWARE LICENSING, LAW & PRACTICE (2d ed. 2018); RAYMOND T. NIMMER & JEFF C.
DODD, MODERN LICENSING LAW (2017).
365 Intellectual property license drafters can also shape and mold the difference between a
contractual covenant and a license condition. See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Enforcement of
Open Source Software Licenses: The MDY Trio’s Inconvenient Complications, 14 YALE J.L.
& TECH. 106, 124–28 (2011); Gomulkiewicz, supra note 356, at 342–44.
366 Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 221–24 (2014).
367 Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1664 (2017), is another example of Justice Thomas
addressing the significance of remedies (federal and state injunctive relief) in the context of
the Biologics Price Competition Act of 2009.
368 But see BJ Ard, Notice and Remedies in Copyright Licensing, 80 MO. L. REV. 313, 313–
80 (2015); Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Fostering the Business of Innovation: The Untold Story of Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, 7 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 445, 447–60 (2012);
Orit Fischman Afori, Flexible Remedies as a Means to Counteract Failures in Copyright
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proach looks at patents end-to-end (from filing to remedies), realizing that adjusting remedies is often the best-fitting restraint on potentially pernicious behavior. In this regard, Justice Thomas’s approach has succeeded where proposed legislation and regulation of NPEs has largely failed.
Justice Thomas’s opinion in Quanta also laid the foundation for the importance of contract remedies in patent licensing cases. Justice Thomas used a
footnote in Quanta to insert contract law into the equation, although it was not
actually in the equation in the Quanta case because neither party raised it.369
Building on the discrete footnote in Quanta, contract remedies took center
stage when the Court returned to patent exhaustion five years later in Impression Products.370 On five separate occasions, Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion of
the Court in Impression Products mentions that conditions on end-user purchases are a matter of contractual arrangements and contract remedies.371 This
focus on right-sizing remedies—contract as opposed to patent law remedies—
harkens back to Justice Thomas’s approach to adjusting remedies in eBay.
V. INCREMENTALISM AS RESPECT FOR SEPARATION OF POWERS
During the Roberts Court era, Justice Thomas has helped shape the Supreme Court’s intellectual property law jurisprudence with his incrementalistic
approach. His opinions consistently emphasize that the Court is only ruling on
the specific facts before it. Justice Thomas’s measured approach is wellrepresented by his statement in Alice that “we need not labor to delimit the precise contours of the ‘abstract ideas’ category in this case.”372 However, many
scholars and practitioners take issue with this approach.373 As Robert Merges
put it in his critique of Alice, “To say we did not get an answer is to miss the
depth of the non-answer we did get.”374
Law, 29 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 2–45 (2011); Peter Lee, The Evolution of Intellectual
Property Infrastructure, 83 WASH. L. REV. 39, 46–121 (2008).
369 Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 637 n.7 (2008). Historically, contracts have always been an important part of the intellectual property protection equation.
See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Contracts Mattered as Much as Copyrights, 66 J. COPYRIGHT
SOC’Y USA 441, 442–44 (2019).
370 Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1530–36 (2017).
371 Id. at 1530–31, 1533, 1535, 1537.
372 Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 221 (2014). Justice Ginsburg was also an
incrementalistic who respected the separation of powers. See Ryan Vacca & Ann Bartow,
Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s Copyright Jurisprudence, 22 NEV. L.J. (forthcoming 2022).
373
See James M. Fischer, The “Right” to Injunctive Relief for Patent Infringement, 24
SANTA CLARA COMPUT. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 20 (2007) (arguing that the eBay decision is
“sufficiently terse, pithy, and fractured” as to “provide . . . support to practically any conclusion one wishes to draw from the decision”); Babak Nouri, A Realistic Perspective on PostAlice Software Eligibility, IPWATCHDOG (Oct. 14, 2018), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/20
18/10/14/realistic-perspective-post-alice-software-patent-eligibility/id=101977/#
[https://perma.cc/G6JN-SQT4] (arguing that the Alice decision wreaked havoc).
374 Rob Merges, Symposium: Go Ask Alice—What Can You Patent After Alice v. CLS
Bank?, SCOTUSBLOG (June 20, 2014, 12:04 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/
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But judicial restraint is not an abdication of responsibility.375 Courts are
simply not well equipped to make broad and thoughtful innovation policy
through the case-by-case litigation process.376 By declining to play the role of
policy-maker, the Supreme Court lets Congress and the Executive Branch play
their leading roles in intellectual property policy-making.377 This emphasis on
constitutional separation of powers in intellectual property law has been endorsed by both the conservative and liberal wings of the Supreme Court.378
And it may be working.
Post-Alice, both the Executive Branch and Congress have begun to focus
intently on better defining unpatentable abstract ideas and clarifying when an
abstract idea has been transformed into a patentable invention. Recently, Congress held extensive hearings on clarifying patent eligibility379 and the United
symposium-go-ask-alice-what-can-you-patent-after-alice-v-cls-bank [https://perma.cc/23U7P9YA]; see also Jordanna Goodman, Case Update: Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 21 B.U.
J. SCI. & TECH. L. 224, 226–30 (2015). But see Perry & Chung, supra note 217, at 73 (“What
some register as a complaint, others see as a virtue. . . . The Mayo-Alice framework . . . constrain[s] eligibility decisions while still allowing for the claim-specific inquiry
necessary in this area.”).
375 Justice Thomas describes his approach to decision-making this way: “What is my role in
this case—as a judge? . . . In the legislative and executive branches, it’s acceptable . . . to
make decisions based on your personal opinions or interests. The role of a judge, by contrast,
is to interpret and apply the choices made in those branches, not to make policy choices of
his own.” THOMAS, supra note 10, at 204.
376 Moreover, litigation does little to reveal information about intellectual property transactions. See Mark A. Lemley et al., The Patent Enforcement Iceberg, 97 TEX. L. REV. 801, 801
(2019). See generally GOMULKIEWICZ ET AL., supra note 165.
377 According to Justice Thomas,
[W]hether it’s federalism or separation of powers, it’s so important that we realize that our great
protection is that everyone stays in their assigned roles. . . .
. . . I have looked my clerks in the eye at the end of the term, and the question is, have we
ever, ever stepped beyond, one time, during the term, beyond our assigned roles?

Thomas, supra note 21, at 18–19.
378 See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)
(majority opinion by Justice Stevens); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 (2003) (majority opinion by Justice Ginsburg); Star Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct.
1002, 1034 (2017) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
379 Hearings to Examine the State of Patent Eligibility in America Before the Subcomm. on
Intell. Prop. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (2019). Senators Chris Coons
(D-Del.) and Thom Tillis (R-N.C.) have led congressional efforts to revise the Patent Act,
releasing proposals in April and May 2019. See Press Release, Sens. Tillis and Coons and
Reps. Collins, Johnson, and Stivers Release Section 101 Patent Reform Framework (Apr.
17, 2019), https://www.tillis.senate.gov/2019/4/sens-tillis-and-coons-and-reps-collins-johns
on-and-stivers-release-section-101-patent-reform-framework [https://perma.cc/X9MR-GMC
X]; Press Release, Sens. Tillis and Coons and Reps. Collins, Johnson, and Stivers Release
Draft Bill Text to Reform Section 101 of the Patent Act (May 22, 2019),
https://www.tillis.senate.gov/2019/5/sens-tillis-and-coons-and-reps-collins-johnson-andstivers-release-draft-bill-text-to-reform-section-101-of-the-patent-act [https://perma.cc/D5C
B-CUVE]; see also Restoring America’s Leadership in Innovation Act, H.R. 6264, 115th
Cong. (2018); Deferred Subject Matter Eligibility Response Pilot Program, 87 Fed. Reg. 776
(Jan. 6, 2022) (establishing a pilot program that provides opportunity to evaluate how de-
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States Patent Office issued new guidelines for patent examiners.380 And most
recently, Congress passed the Trademark Modernization Act of 2020 to restore
the presumption of irreparable harm for injunctive relief in trademark cases,
adjusting the approach outlined by Justice Thomas in his first significant intellectual property case for the Roberts Court, eBay v. MercExchange.381 Thus,
Justice Thomas’s measured approach has jumpstarted conversations that Congress and the Executive Branch needed to have about intellectual property law
and its role in innovation policy.382
CONCLUSION
This Article highlights Justice Thomas’s intellectual property law jurisprudence in the Roberts Court era. His role in intellectual property cases has taken
on historic importance as the number of his opinions for the Court has surpassed even Justices known for their intellectual property expertise. That role is
particularly important given the significance of intellectual property in the
modern information economy. If some find Justice Thomas’s role as “chief justice” of intellectual property law surprising, then they will find it more surprising that Justice Thomas’s opinions are normally unanimous, even in cases that
have vexed the lower courts. Justice Thomas’s intellectual property law opinions for the Court reflect a deep respect for the constitutional separation of
powers, as he invites and sometimes nudges Congress to play the leading role
in innovation policy given to it in the U.S. Constitution. That approach may not
always be popular with scholars or practicing lawyers, but it represents a strong
consensus among Justices, liberal and conservative alike, who want to provide
ample breathing space for technological and business model innovation.

ferred applicant responses to subject matter eligibility rejections affect examination efficiency and patent quality).
380 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019);
see Brian Eakin, Iancu Touts Patent Eligibility Guidance That Just “Works,” LAW360,
(Sept. 26, 2019, 7:12 PM), https://law360.com/articles/1202980 [https://perma.cc/F5WUQTT2]; TOOLE & PAIROLERO, supra note 220, at 5–6 (concluding that the USPTO’s revised
guidance in January 2019 had “reversed the upward trend in subject matter eligibility rejections” and “decreased uncertainty in patent examination”); Perry & Chung, supra note 217,
at 73 (arguing that the Federal Circuit has provided patent practitioners with “a wealth of
exemplars” in the six years after Alice).
381 H.R. 6196, 116th Cong. (2020); S. Res. 3449, 116th Cong. (2020) (enacted Dec. 27,
2020, as part of the year-end Consolidated Appropriations Act for 2021). See generally
Mark A. Lemley, Did eBay Irreparably Harm Trademark Law?, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1795 (2017).
382 Justice Thomas believes strongly that the Court should not purport to give advice to
Congress on how it might act or give the Court’s blessing to hypothetical intellectual property legislation. See Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct 994, 1008 (2020) (Thomas, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment).
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136 (2013) (patent); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Lab’ys, Inc., 566 U.S. 66
(2012) (patent).
8—Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995) (trademark); Dickinson v.
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